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ABSTRACT
This report is Volume 3 of a five-volume report
on the operation of the J-2 engines during the
flight of Apollo/Saturn A;_-502. This volume
presents the analysis of the J-2 engine J-20_2
during first burn, orbital coast, and failure
to restart.
The volumes of this report are:
Volume 1:
Volume 2:
@Volume 3:
Volume Zl:
Volume 5:
Flight Performance Analysis
S-II Stage Failure Analysis
S-IVB'Stage Failure Analysis
Flight Failure Verification Testing
Post-Flight Design Modifications
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SUMMARY
J-2 engine J20_2, installed on the S-IVB stage of the AS-502 vehicle,
failed to achieve restart during flight on _ April 1968. This report
presents the results of the flight data analysis and the engine verifi-
cation test program conducted to demonstrate the failure mode.
Analysis of flight data indicated t_at the augmented spark igniter fuel
line had failed, allowing burnout of the igniter, thus preventin_ engine
restart. Verification tests on an PAD J-2 engine demonstrated the pre-
dicted events. The analysis and verification tests, therefore, provide
proof of the failure mode which prevented AS-502, S-IVB restart.
Prior to launch, engine J20_2 had accumulated 70_.6 seconds of mainstage
operation in seven tests; five engine acceptance and two stage acceptance.
All component modifications and replacements were accumulated in accord-
ance with established procedures. Engine data do not indicate any sig-
nificant areas of compromise or concern regarding the hardware quality.
Engine J20_2 was a 225K (225,000 pounds thrust) configuration engine
(actual calibration point was approximately 229K), requiring restart after
a 180-minute orbital coast.
No AS-502, S-IVB engine problems were noted during checkout, FRT, or CDDT
operations, and prelaunch preparations were normal and satisfactory. Vehicle
liftoff occurred on schedule at 0_00 PST (range time = 0). A summary
chronology of subsequent AS-502, S-IVB flight anomalies is shown in Table I ,
and concludes with a fail,re to restart.
Flight data analysis indicates several anomalies during engine J2Ok_ first=
burn operation and attempted restart which enable definition of the primary
mode of failure and subsequent damage:
. e The engine area external temperature enviro,ment data_eviated
significantly from data from AS-501, beginning at 6_5 seconds.
R-7_50-2
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a. Between 645 and 696 seconds, chilling of the entire engine
area was noted; the rate of chilling increased significantly
at 68_ seconds. Measurements indicate that the leakage was
liquid hydrogen, and that the point of origin was near the
biOV, fuel bleed valve, and gas generator valve, and gas gen-
erator oxidizer bootstrap line.
b. Between 696 _d 703 seconds, substantial heating was noted.
The first temperature increase was on the fuel pump side of
the engine, while the second surge (peaking at 700 seconds)
was more significant on the oxidizer pump side.
c. General chilling was re-established at 703 seconds, except
that some low-level heating was noted in the oxidizer heatup
across the turbopump.
d. No signilicant chilling _as noted during coast. (The actuator
hydraulic system apparently froze because of chilling residual
in the lines from first-burn hydrogen leakage.)
e. Chilling began again at restart counmlnd when the _ and ASI
oxidizer valve were opened.
Engine performance, which had previously been normal and at the
predicted level, decayed significantly beginning at 68_ seconds.
a. A steady decay was noted between 68_ and 692 seconds (3.6-psia
loss in main chamber pressure).
b. I_nediately thereafter, another _teady decay was noted between
692 and 702 seconds (12.6-psia loss in main chamber pressure).
c. Between 702 seconds and cutoff at 7_7 seconds, no further per-
formance loss occurred.
The engine failed _o restart when the cor_nand was given. All
start conditions were proper, pump speeds and accelerations from
start bottle blowdox_n were as anticipated, all valve operations
occurred as programmed, and gas generatsr ignition and subsequent
_7_SO-2
operation were satisfactory. Main chamber pressure failed to
rise in a normal manner, and cutoff was initiated.
Examination of this evidence led to the formulation of the following fail-
ure mode hypothesis:
I. A small leak began at 6_5 seconds because of failure of the ASI
fuel upper flex line. The initial failure was probably a fatigue
crack in a bellows convolution. Leakage rate was less than 0.6
Ib/sec.
2. Beginning at 68_ seconds, the leakage rate increased because of
continued and progressive failure of the ASI flex line. Fuel
leakage increased to a level between 2.6 and 3.9 ib/sec (because
of complete line failure, and depending on the location within
the flex line), at which time backflow of propellant from the ASI
began.
3. Backflow of propellant through the ASI caused rapid burnout of the
ASI, allowing increased propellant leakage and performance decay
during the erosion. The hot gas from ASI backflow caused a shor_-
term heating to be recorded in the engine area, but cryogenic hydro-
gen leakage up to 3.9 lb/sec dominated the subsequent environment.
Performance stabilized after ASI burnout.
To simulate the failure and attempt to duplicate the results, R&D engine
J016-_ was configured and calibrated to simulate engine J20_2. Special
test equipment was added to allow control of ASI fuel flow (to simulate
Aine leakage) and overboard dumping of fuel at the ASI (to simulate line
failure), and a verification test performed. Thc test simulate, the following:
i. 65 seconds of normal mainstage
2. 55 seconds of operation at simulated ASI fuel leakage of 0.6 Ib/sec
5. Increasing leakage to complete line failure
_. Backflow of ASI combustion products for 29 seconds
R-7450-2
Posttest evaluation indicated that all predicted events had occurred:
1. Operation at ASI mixture ratios over 2.4 produced substantial
damage to the main injector AS1 nozzle cavity.
2. The ASI burned out because of propellant backflow. The burnout
completely destroyed the ASI fuel line and injection manifold_
cut one spark cable in half and badly eroded both spark plugs,
add eroded adjacent main injector and gimbal bearing surfaces.
3. A performance loss was noted, beginning at the time backflow was
initiated and concluding shortly thereafter (when ASI erosion
reached an equilibrium condition). This loss correlated well
with the portion of engine J2042 losses hypothesized as a result
of ASI failure.
In addition, adequate evidence existed during hot-fire testing to support
the hypothesis model of the observed flight thermal environment.
The combination of flight analysis and test verification were deemed suffi-
cient proof of AS-502, S-IVB events. Line testing and redesign were instituted.
A detailed discussion of all observed flight anomalies, failure analysis,
and engine verification testing is presented in the following pages.
TABLE 1
AS-502, s-rVB HqGINEJ2042 EVHqTS S_
Range Time r seconds
577.3
6_5
684
692
696
7/,7
II_61_.7
Iis617
11,623
Event
Engine Start (First Burn)
Start of Engine Compartmeht Temperature Decrease
Initial Performance Decay
Second Performance Decay
Start of Engine Compartment Heating
Engine Cutoff
Engine Start Signal (Second Burn)
Start of Engine Compartment Temperature Decrease
Thrust Chamber Fails to Ignite
INTRODUCTIONTO FLIGHT ANALYSIS AND
VERIFICATION TESTING
Several anomalies were observed during the S-IVB stage of flight AS-502.
These are shown in Fig. 1 ant described in detail in subsequent sections
of this report. Each category event is described in turn, beginning with
the first anomaly noted and continuing to the failure t_ restart, which
was the final malfunction. Not all the u_usual events discussed are rele_
vant to the fail,re to restart; however, they all represent a deviation
from previous experience, which made detailed examination mandatory.
Subsequent to the anomaly discussion, an overall failure analysis and
evaluation of pressurization systems and engine start conditions.is
presented. From these data, a failure mode hypothesis is developed and
an engine test verification plan is documented.
R-7_50-2 5
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E_T_Y II_I)UC]_) VIBRATION EFFECTS ON THE J-2 ENGINE
EVENT DESCRIPTION
Descriptive Data
Approximately 105 seconds after liftoff, the S-IC stage exhibited abnormal
longitudinal oscillations in the region of approximately 5.3 cps. The
oscillations increased in amplitude bctween 110 and 128 seconds, at which
time they began to decrease until S-1C cutoff which occ_trred at approxi-
mately 145 seconds. The phenomenon was analyzed and determined to be the
POG0 effect. The P0G0phenomenon is a system closed-loop interaction of
three vehicle systems: the vehicle structure, the vehicle suction pro-
pellant feed system, aud the engine system. When the structural mode
frequency approximates the vehicle suction resonant frequency, a tuning
can occur which, with sufficient gain, can combine to produce flow distur-
bances that result in turbopump suction pressure oscillations. Resultant
vibrations measured at the F-1 engine gimbal blocks reache_ peaks at 0.42 g.
Figure 2 describes the POGO activity on AS-502 with plots of F-1 chamber
pressure, fuel pump inlet pressure, and acceleration at the gimbal block.
At approximately 133 seconds after liftoff, a sharp pulse (17 g peak to
peak) was recorded on an accelerometer mounted on the S-IVB forward skirt.
Various other instrumentation channels indicated disturbances at this time.
J-2 engine acceleration instrumentation is not available in the low-frequency
ranges (0 to 40 cps) because of response limitations of _he single-side band
telemetry channels. Also, the engine parameters were not being sampled
during the 17 g pulse. Consequently, it is not possible to determine directly
the vibration effects that the J-2 engines sustained during the POGO activity
and the subsequent pulse anomaly.
Possible Failure Modes
None of the S-IVB anomalies can be linked directly with the POG_ phenomenon.
If any connection exists between the POGO vibration activities and the J-2
tM
B
r
engine performance shift, it is indirect and indeterminate from available
flight data. The only possible relationship would be a mode of failure
in which minor damage could have been sustained by the ASI fuel line because
of vibration (i.e., cracked bellows, broken or fatigued braid wires), which
subsequently progressed to more serious failure with resultant fuel leakage
after the engine was operating in the mainstage condition.
BOOST-PHASE POGO EFFECT TESTING
In an effort to simulate the vibration effects of the boost phase on the
J-2 engine during the flight, engine J2C38 was instrumented and mounted
on a vibration table to produce longitudinal and then lateral vibration
inputs. Figures 3 and _ show the levels of vibration up to 500 Hz
encountered by engine J20_2 during the boost phase of flight in both the
longitudinal and lateral axes. The flight data points represent vibra-
tion levels measured during the boost phase at th_ S-IVB stage accelerom-
eter mounting points, as noted on Fig. 3 and _ and located on Fig. 5.
The vibration test program conducted on engine J2038 consisted of a stand-
ard vibration laboratory survey over all frequency ranges prevalent during
the AS-502 flight. Acceleration levels known to have been encountered in
flight were equalled or exceeded during the test program, as shown in
Fig. 3 and _ . The testing did not simulate flight evvironment with
respect to vehicle spring rates (although stage actuators were used),
altitude pressure, simultaneous three-axis vibration, or the acoustical
envirvnment. Liquid nitrogen was used to simulate the presence of cry-
ogenic propellants in the engine. No relevant damage was incurred by the
engine as a result of the test program; consequently, no evidence was
produced to link the flight anomalies with a vibration problem.
Conclusion
In the absence of any substantiating data, i_ is not possible to infer
any engine J20_2 damage during boost-phase POGO.
R-7650-2 9
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Figure 3. J-2 Engine Boost-Phase Vibration Test,
Longitudinal Axis
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Acoustic and Vibration Measurement Locations
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ABNORMALJ-2 I_GINE GIMBAL EXCURSION AT ENGINE START AND
J-2 ENGINE ALIGNME_ DL_ING OPERATION
DESCRIPTION
Review of J-2 engine gimbal data from the S-IVB first burn of flight
AS-502 revealed several unusual events that occurred during engine opera-
tion. A description of the events and results of the analysis made to
determine whether or not the events were linked with the flight anomalies
are presented. All times sho'_ are from liftoff (range time).
ABNORMAL GIRdBAL TRANSI_TfS AT START
Defining Data
Engine gimbal transients were noted at the time of first-burn engine start
signal (577.2 seconds). The pitch engine position went from 0 degree at
577.5 seconds to a peak of +6.7 degrees at 581.5 seconds, and then to a
peak of -2.3 degrees at 585 seconds. The yaw engine position transient
went from O degree to a peak of -1.37 degrees at 586 seconds. The trans-
ients gradually subsided #o steady-stat_ levels at 610 seconds. Maximum
actuator forces noted during _his activity were +5183 and -6774 pounds in
pitch, and +5700 and -7657 pounds in yaw, respectively.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 are plots of pitch and yaw actuator position, differ-
ential pressure, and servovalve current and depict the gimbal transients
at start, mainstage operation, and cutoff. Figure 9 is an expanded time
plot of pitch actuator position and thrust chamber pressure and shows the
chamber pressure buildup during the gimbal transients at start.
Ceuse of Event
Guidance commands and flight control system parameters revealed that the
transients at start were commanded by the vehicle and resulted from several
unexpected conditions existing at S-II/S-IVB separation. At separation
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(575.6 seconds), the vehicle altitude errors and rates were +7.6 and 0.2
degree/sec in pitch, and -2.h and 0,1 degree/sec iu yaw, respectively.
In addition, the vehicle altitude wa.J 21,000 feet higher than desired.
Vehicle attitude errors at S-II/S-IVBseparatiou for a normal flight were
expected to be within +2.5 degrees in the pitch and yaw axes.
Conclusion
No apparent adverse effects were incurred by the engine as a result of the
gimbal transients at start, as evidenced by normal engine starting through
to mainstage levels. Global acceleration, velocity, and loads duriDg the
transients were well below engine model specifications and structural
design limits.
SHIFTS IN ACTUATOR LOAD AND POSITION AT 6_ SECONDS OF FLIGHT
Defining Data
At 64_ seconds of flight, a gimbal maneuver in pitch was commanded by guid-
ance to correct for a vehicle overspeed condition. The pitch engine posi-
tion went from -0.43 degree peak at 645 seconds to a peak of +0.6 degree
at 630 seconds (Fig. 6 and 7 )_ and then settled down to a steady-state
level of +0.25 degree. Yaw transients were negligible. Following the
maneuver, a change in steady-state levels was noted in pitch actuator dif-
ferential pressure (_P) and position. The A P changed from -175 to +100
psid (A +275 psi), and the position changed from +0.37 to ÷0.23 degree
(A -0.12 degree).
Possible Causes of Event
The possible causes were:
18
.
e
A change in the vehicle's center of gravity and/or effects of
thrust structure compliance following the maneuver
_n external load induced by the engine system
Conclusions
The shift in actuator load and position was not caused by an external
applied load. The phenomenon wae probably allied with item I (above).
The fact that the vehicle had just completed a gimbal maneuver tends to
support tb_s conclusions.
Analysis
The effect of gimbal bearing friction was determined by crossplotting
actuator position and pressure data (Fig. 10 and 11). A 5500-pound actu-
ator force and a 0.2-degree indicated actuator motion was required to
break static gimbal friction about each axis. The magnitude of the shifts
observed in actuator load and position was well within the gimbal bearing
friction envelope. An externally applied force would be manifested by a
load outside of the friction envelope with the absence of a command signal.
Becauze none of these conditions were evident, it was concluded that item 2
(above) was not the cause of the phenomenon.
GD4B_L TR._SI]_S AT 690 SECONDS
Defining Data
Starting at 692 seconds, and continuing for the remainder of the first
burn, small perturbations in pitch and yaw actuator positions and loads
were noted. During this event, a shift in engine performance was in
progress (68_ to 702 second_).
Possible Causes of _ent
The possible causes were:
1. An external load induced by the engine system
2. Guidauce commands
. .19
[ I I
Conclusions
The gimbal transfcnts between 690 seconds and cutoff were induced by guid-
ance commands. There was no indication of external applied forces.
No significant shifts in thrust alignment were noted during engine operation.
Analysis
Actuator position data during the noted transients were compared with the
guidance command data. All actuator motions were accompanied by comnaud
signals. This indicates that no motions were caused by suddenly applied
external forces.
For the given command signals and actuator motions, corresponding actuator
differential pressure (load) characteristics appeared normal and reasonable.
Engine thrust alignment, as determined from the gimbal actuator crossplots,
did not agree well with engine acceptance test data, as shown in the table
below; however, no significant shifts in thrust ali£nmvut occurred during
engine operation. This alignment difference is not considered to be an
anomaly in engine performance; it is probably the result ol thrust struc-
ture compliance and/or vehicle installation tolerance. It was not possible
to obtain useful thrust misalignment data for stage acceptance testing
because of the lack of adequate pretest information of actuator and side-
load restrainer load cell preloaders.
Engine
Acceptance AS-502
Lateral Displacement Along X Axis, inch -0.0610 -0.0_
Lateral Displacement Along Z Axis, inch +0.0_87 -0.159
20 , R-7;50-
Compression Load
D
Figure 10. Croesplot of Pitch Actuator Position vs Load,
AS-502 S-IVB, First Burn
R-7gS0-2
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Figure Crossplot of Yaw Actuator Position vs Load,
AS-502 S-IVB, First Burn
R-7_50-2
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PITCH TRANSIENT AT CUTOFF
Defining Data
At 7_7.2 seconds (approximately 0.17 second after engine cutoff signal),
the engine was moved by the flig_ control system to +2.7 degrees pitch
engine position (Fig. 12), and then returned to null position at 750.8
seconds,
Possible Causes of Event
The possible causes were:
I. Transients were induced by an abnormal engine shutdown
2. Transients were induced by the vehicle
Conclusion
The pitch transient at cutoff was indnced by the vehicle and was a normal
system behavior.
No engine hardware damage resulted from the noted pitch transient.
Analysis
Telemetered data of main engine chamber pressure and actuator differential
pressure and position were analyzed. Engine chamber pres3ure decay was
normal, and both pitch and yaw actuator loads (differential pressure) dur-
ing chamber pressure decay were reasonable (approximately 1000 pounds max-
imum). No evidence wa_ found that linked the gimbal transients to the
engine system.
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The pitch transient at cutoff was induced by the vehicle and was a normal
system behavior. Chi (X) freeze guidance mode began 8 seconds prior to
S-IVB stage engine cutoff, as intended. This mode locks out guidance and
helps reduce the transients going from burn to coast. When this occurred,
a substantial error signal was still being impressed by guidance to the
flight control servosystem. The abrupt removal of the command signal pro-
duced a momentary imbalance in the servosys_em, together with the thrust
tailoff, resulted in tlle displacement of the pitch actuator. "S-IVE Burn
Mode Off" at 750.8 seconds subsequently returned the pitch actuator to
the null position, as intended.
No hardware damage resulted from the gimbal transient at cutoff, as evi-
denced by the normal en_,ine start operation during subsequent restart.
CONCLUSION
Engine gimbal operation was satisfactory throughout the S-IVB stage first
burn. There were no problems evident in the engine gimbal data.
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J-2 ENGINE AREA TEMPERATURE ANOMALIES
The significant events of the thermal environment during the first burn
are presented in Fig. 13. Each of these events is discussed in _etail,
as well as the results during restart. Figure 1_ defines the temperature
measurement locations.
Conclusions based on first- and second-burn thermal environment data are
as follows:
i. A small c:yogenic hydrogen leak started at 6_5 secondq and sub-
stantially increased in magnitude at 68_ seconds.
2. The leak was downstream of the main fuel valve. (This includes
the AS I fuel line.)
3. The location c{ greatest chilling was in the area of the upper
ASI fuel line.
_. Two heating surges were seen; one at 69_ seconds and the other
at 700 seconds.
5. A low level of heating continued on the oxidizer pump side of
the engine (until nearly cutoff) as a result of hot-gas leakage
from the ASI; chilling resumed on the fuel pmp side of the
engine because of the liquid hydrogen leakage from the ASI
fuel line.
The first heoting surge was most likely associatedwith the rupture of the
J-2 engine ASI fuel line at the break interface and the second heating
surge with the resulting ASI failure caused by back flow from thc ASI.
S-IVB FIRST-BUIt_ THEBMAL ENVIRONMENT
Event Description
Engine compartment temperatures started abnoF_ally chilling at 6_5 seconds.
This chilling increased in magnitude at 68% seconds.
R-7_50-2 - 27
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Figure 13. First-Burn Thermal Environmen_
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AS-502 S-IVB Temperature Heasurements and Locations
• I
Dat_.__a. M0V closing control line temperature (Fig. 13) is representative
of the engine compartment chilling that started at 6&5 seconds and was
noted on at least six other low thermal mass parameters. At 68& seconds,
the chilling rate substantially increased and was noted on at least five
additional measurements.
Failure Modes. The failure mode was leak from a stage or vehicle propel-
lant or pressurization system.
Best Hypothesis. The best hypothesis is that a small cryogenic hydrogen
leak in the area of the upper ASI fuel line started at 6_ seconds and
substantially increased in magnitude at 68_ seconds.
Analysis. A comparison of the AS-501 and AS-502 M0V closing control line
temperature (Fig. 15 ) demonstrates that, on AS-502, a chilling of the
measurement began at 6_5 seconds. At least six other low thermal mass
measurements also showed chilling at this time. This is indicative of a
small cryogenic leak. The leak rate increased substantially at 68_ seconds,
as indicated by the increased chilling rate on the smaller thermal mass
components and the beginning of chilling of larger thermal mass components_
Some of these parameters are the M0V actuator (Fig 16), gas generator
valve position indicator (gas generator valve position shifts), and gas
generator fuel inlet wall (Fig. 17). These parameters are located on the
fuel pump side of the engine (Fig. I_).
Prom the temperature decrease observed (to less than -260 F on the MOV
closing control line), it is known that the leak is cryogenic in nature.
Both engine helium usage and the hydrogen and helivm pressurization flows
from the engine were normal during the first burn and, therefore, it is
lmown these systems are not responsible for the leakage.
An analysis based on the properties of a liquid expanding into a high
vacuum was accomplished to determine the chilling effect on engine com-
ponents. It was found that some components were chilled more than i3
50
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possible with oxygen expansion (-330 F is the minimum temperature for the
vacuum environment encountered). The gas generator fuel inlet wall tem-
perature (Fig. 17) attained -_09 F, and from this it was concluded the
leak source was hydrogen rather than oxygen. By.knowing the properties
as a. function of distance of the expanding liquid in a vacuum, and the
rate of chill of different components, it was possible to locate the
general area of the leak source as the upper section of the ASI fuel line.
Event Description
Engine compartment heating at 696 and 700 seconds.
Dat__a. Figure 18 is a comparison of the gas generator oxidizer bootstrap
line No. 1 and the M0V actuator temperature measurements during the period
of initial engine compartment heating. Figure 19 is a similar comparison
for the main oxidizer supply line flange and the oxidizer pump discharge
temperature. These parameters d_monstrate tbe two general types of heat-
ing seen. Temperature parameters on the fuel pump side of the engine
(Fig. 18) had an initial temperature surge at 696 seconds of greater mag-
nitude than the surge at 700 seconds. Parameters on the oxidizer pump
side o_ the engine (Fig. 19) showed the opposite effect.
Causes
A hot-gas source of leakage is required for heating iu the vacuum environ-
ment of the flight because combustion cannot be sustained below a pressure
o_ _bout 0.2 _._ia. The available _om'ces of hot gas arc:
I. Gas generator and exhaust system
2. Thrust chamber
3. ASI
To explain the two temperature surge_ seen, it is necessary that there
be either: (I) a single source of hot-gas leakage increasing in magnitude,
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or (2) a hot-gas leak that is redirected or changed in character by in-
creasing cryogenic leakage and/or component erosion.
Best I_pothesis. The first heating was associated with the destruction
of the ASI fuel line st the break interface with resulting backflow from
the engine; the second is associated with the redirection of the hot gas
from the ASI when the upper fuel flpx line ASI were destroyed by the
backflow.
Analysis. The temperature surges seen in Fig. 18 and 19 show two distinct
characteristics. On the fuel pinup side of the engine (Fig. 18),the initial
surge is of greater magnitude than the surge at 700 seconds. For the oxi-
dizer pump-side parameters (Fig. 19), the opposite situation is present,
i.e., the second surge is of greater magnitude than the first. From this
it is concluded tha_ the hot-gas leak is either redirected or changed in
character by increasing cryogenic leakage, not just an increase in mag-
nitude of heating as this would have been reflected in an equal manner
to the first surge in all parameters.
A hydrogen leak from the thrust chamber jacket that eventually results in
hot-gas leakage from the combustion chamber fails to satisfy sufficient
criteria. A leak in the jacket could be hypothesized to cause erosion
through the jacket walls, but this would have to occur between the leak
source and fuel manifold on the sam_ set of tubes. The temperature data
do not support this hypothesis; they neither explain the two temperature
surges nor the chilling of components after the hot-gas leakage below the
fuel manifold in the ar_a of initial leakage while heating exists on the
opposite side of the engine (gas generator valve position shifts). Also,
it fails to explain the failure to restart.
A gas generator or exhaust system leak also fails to explain the tempera-
ture data seen. A hot-gas leakage from this source would not account for
the chilling, the second temperature surge, the lack of external heating
on restart, nor the failure to restart.
R-7_5o-2
From the simulated ASI fuel line failure test on engine J01_-6, it was
found that hot-g_s leakage from the A$I would destroy the upper flex line
at the ASI shortly after backflo_ developed. The initial temperature
surge is, therefore, believed to be associated with backflow leakage from
the ASI at the break interface, and the second surge with the destruction
of th_ ASI fuel line at the ASI. This source of hot gas (about 1 lb/sec)
was redirected because of its new location and the effects of the fuel
leak from the broken ASI fuel line (about _ lb/sec), thus accounting for
the larger heating effects on the oxidizer pump side of the engine.
Event Description
General chilling of the vehicle with selective heating of components on
the oxidizer pump followed the second temperature surge at 700 seconds.
Data. Figure 20 shows the increases in temperature of the oxidizer pump
inlet and the change in temperature across the pump, and between the pump
and the discharge measurements. Figure 21 demonstrates the resumption of
the chilling trend in vehicle parameter on the fuel pump side of the engine.
Possible Cause. Hot gases heating part of the engine area combined with
chilling from a cryogenic leak to produce selective heating and general
chilling.
Best l_vppthesis. Following destruction of the upper fuel flex line and
ASI, chilling of vehicle parameters on the fuel pump side resumed because
a flow from the liquid side of the fuel line, and heating of the oxidizer
pump side of the engine continued at a reduced level because of leakage
of hot gas from the ASI past the &imbal bearing.
Analysis. The temperature surge starting at 700 seconds increased in in-
tensity until 703 seconds and then decreased. Heating continued on the
oxidizer pump side of the engine -ntil nearly cutoff. To isolate the
area of heating, the change in temperature between measureme_,ts on the
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oxidizer systc_ was found (Fig. 20). The p_np inlet-to-bearing coolant
change in temperature yields the heating across the pump, whereas any
heating _o the pump discharge ducting would be reflected in the bearing
coolant-to-pump discharge measurement. A small temperature increase was
seen at the oxidizer pump inlet (O.0_ F maximum with a sustained level
of 0.01F), but the largest temperature increase was seen between this
measurement and the oxidizer pump bearing coolant (0.5 maximumwith a
sustained level of 0.15). No heating was seen on the discharge ducting.
Therefore, some smal! heating persisted after the iIlitial temperature
sm'ge to the oxidizer pump inlet ducting until nearly cutoff.
Test 313-O41 on engine J016-4 was accomplished to simulate the flight
failure of the ASI fuel line. Although the engine test did not exactly
simul_te the thermal environment to be seen on the flight, it did produce
some useful supporting data in this regard. Iv several important aspects,
there would be a difference between this test and a flight. In the vacuum
environment of a flight, external combustion will not take place once the
pressure becomes less than about 0.2 psia, nor would oxygen be present to
support combustion for any unburned hydrogen from the ASI. Also, fuel
from the destroyed upper flex section would be present on the fligllt to
chill at least the fuel pump side of the engine.
Heating of the oxidizer pump side of the engine was experienced on engine
JO14-6 partially because of hog-gas leakage past the gimbal bearing
(Fig. 22). This would account for the similar condition that was present
during flight. The difference between the oxidizer pump inlet and oxidizer
pump bearing temperature for the test on engine JOI6-A was 0.5 F during
the time of sustained heoting. This substantiates the fact that heating
to the ozidizer side of the engine can occur from ASI fuel-side hot-gas
leakage. (The magnitude of heating cannot be compared because the con-
ditions encountered on flight were not present.)
The par,._.ters on the fuel pump side of the engine continued their tem-
perature decrease following 703 seconds. Some temperature parameters on
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the fuel pump side of the engine showed heating until 703 seconds but,
after this time, chilling was observed to be the predominant thermal
effect (Fig. 21 ). Hot gas undoubtedly was present on the fuel side of
the engine, but the chilling effect of the hydrogen was dominant. This
would be expected with failure of the /LSI fuel line because of the large
liquid hydrogen leak flow.
S-ITB RESTART THERMAL ENVIRONMEN_
Event Descripti-n
Upon engine start command at restart, chilling was again noted in the
engine area.
Dat__aa. Figure 23 is a comparison plot of AS-501 and AS-502 M0V line tem-
perature at restart. Chilling is noted on the measurement 2 seconds
after engine start command, 11,617 seconds range time.
Possible Causes. The possible cause was leakage of a cryogenic propellant.
Best Hyppthesi_s. Leakage occurred from somewhere downstream of either
the main fuel valve, including the ASI fuel line, or the ASI oxidizer line.
Analysis
Figure 23 Shows the N0V line temperature measurement is not chilled uvtil
after engine start command. Because propellants are down to all engine
valves prior ÷o engine start, it must be concluded that the source of
leakage is in the areas shown in Fig. 2_. either downstream of the bIFV,
including the ASI fuel line, or downstream of the ASI oxidizer valve.
Other engine parameters shewed chilling after mainstage signal when the
pumps have developed sufficient pressure to produce the flows required to
chillthese parameters. No parameters showed heating, thus eliminating
the gas generator and exhaust system as the source of hot gas. These data
support the earlier hypothesis of failure of the ASI fuel line.
R-7650-2
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GAS GE_rERATOR VALVE POSITION SHIFTS
Event Description
In the time span between 680 and 745 seconds from liftoff, the gas gen-
erator valve position trace indicated an abnormal drift of 3.2 percent
toward closed (Fig. 25). Because the drift was coincident with the engine
performance changes and the other anomalies, a study was conducted to de-
termine its cause, and to establish if it could ha_e contributed to gas
generator and engine performance decay.
Supporting Data
A plot of gas generator valve position and chamber pressure versus time
from liftoff for S-'VB first and second burn is shown in Fig. 25. On
the first barn," the valve position exhibited the typical overshcot at
start, held at 92 percent until 685 seconds, and then drifted toward
closed. At engine cutoff (747 seconds), the valve had drifted to 89-
percent open and the position versus time trace still was trending closed.
A plot of valve position versus time for a typical firing also is plotted
in Fig. 25.
Possible Cause
It was postulated that the position shift was the result of the engine
compartment cryogenic leak, which caused contraction of the housing by
chilling. A laboratory test program was conducted to attempt duplication
of valve closing by chilling the potentiometer or actuator housing.
The test program and study were performed as planned, and the conclusions
are as follows.
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Conclusions
I. The gas generator valve motion between 685 and 7_7 seconds was
the result of a cryogenic fluid spraying the valve body, re-
sulting in differential contraction between the body and its
internal components.
2. The motion was insufficient to cause an increase in gas generator
valve resistance and did not cause the engine performance shi£t.
3. The fluid leakage was frc_ some source other than the gas gen-
erator system.
_. No gas generator system anomalies occurred on the subject flight.
Test Program
The test program was conducted in the Rocketdyne environmental laboratory.
The test apparatus consisted of a gas generator control valve with a bOO-
psi helium source for valve opening (Fig. 26). Skin temperature thermo-
couples were attached to the actuator body and to the potentiometer. For
chilling, 0.8 ib/sec of LN2was sprayed onto the actuator housing. Con-
tinuous recordings o£ valve position and body temperatures were taken.
Two tests were run with LN 2 impinging on the exterior of the actuated gas
generator valve. On the first test (No. I0), the £L_2 was directed to im-
pinge on the side of the actuator housing, as shown in Fig. 26. On the
second test (No. ii), the LN2 was directed to impinge on the potentiometer
housing. On both tests, approximately half the actuator housing was bathed
in LN 2.
Plots of valve position, gas generator valve body temperature, and poten-
tiome_er body temperature versus time from start of LN2 flow for tests
No. i0 and II are given in Fig. 27 and 28. The differences between the
chilldown rates for the body and petentiometer are explained by location
of the LN 2 spray. On test No. lO, the flow was directed to the body near
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the body thermocouple location whereas, on test No. II. the flow was
directed ol,to the potentiometer.
Although body and potentiometer apparent chill rates were quite different
for the two tests, the valve closing rates were similar. The slow chillin£
of the body on test No. II was because the spray was directed on the side
away from the thermocouple and the actual body ch£11 rate was similar for
the two tests. The time for the ,'alve to move 3.3-percent closed was
165 seconds on test No. I0 and 185 seconds on test No. II. This indicates
the motion is caused by chilling the valve body while the internal compon-
ents remain warm. Both tests _ere for approximately 2500 seconds. Each
time, the valve moved toward closed for approximately 350 seconds, then
began to move toward open. By2000 seconds, it was back to 100-percent
open. An extended time plot for test No. I0 is sho_u in Fig. 29.
Analysis
_ze apparer_t valve motion is the result of differential contraction between
the housing and internal components, caused by chilling from the external
cryogenic leak. As illustrated on test No. II, very rapid chilling of the
potentiometer alone will not cause the motion. It is caused by temperature
difference between the body and internal components. As chilling continues.
the internal components finally chill and the motion reverses itself as
shown in Fig. 29.
The apparent valve _otion can be understood by referring to s valve section
view (Fig. 30 ). Chilling of the housing will cause housing shrinkage
while internal components remain initially warm. With the potentiometer
mounted to the housing and measuring differential motion between the housing
and yoke, relative shrinkage appears as valve motion.
Chilling the valve will cause changes in the length of the fuel and oxi-
dizer poppet st:'oke, the maximtnn difference being approximately 0,007
inch. Previous tests have shown that gas generator valve resistance does
52
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0
not change until poppet stroke has been decreased by at least 0._ inch.
Chilling the valve in any manner will not cause poppet stroke changes
approaching that maguitude. It is, therefore, concluded that the apparent
valve motion did not affect gas generator operation.
On test No. I0, 165 seconds were required for the valve to move 3.2-
percent closed. Based upon a weighted average of the two temperature
measurements, it is estimated that the average body temperature at the
end of 163 seconds was aFproximately -250 F. On test No. II, the cor-
responding time was 185 seconds and the estimated average body tempera-
ture was -200 F. Averaging the two and_king an initial body temperature
of 70 F, this means that, to achieve 3.3-percent potentiometer motion,
the body temperature must be decreased approximately 290 degrees.
Assu_ing that one-half the body mass of 21.5 pounds gets chilled, the
sensible heat extracted from the body is approximately 630 Btu o_ over
175 seconds, the body average heat flux was -5.6 Btu/sec.
On the flight, the time for 3.3-percent motion was 52 seconds. If the
same temperature change occurred as on the tests, thc average body heat
flux on the flight was -!2 Btu/sec over the 52 seconds, or three times
greater than on the test.
An attempt was made to estimate the probable distance of the ieak source
from the valve body to cause the observed chilling. The analysis was
based on the limited knowledge of characteristics of cryogenic fluids
leaking _ a vacuum, and on the estimated leak from the ASI fuel line.
That distance was calculated between I and 2 feet, vhich provid_,s reason-
able correlation with the assumed leak location.
ORBITAL TI_IAL ENVIRONM_T
Orbital Coast
The coast period on the S-IVB_as slightly longer than two orbits. The
orbit, which was planned to be nearly circular, was elliptical with a
R-7_5o-2
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195-mile apogee and a 95-mile perigee due to S-II pro{_ulsion problems.
The vehicle orientation was _in No. 3 in the down poai_on until 5780
seconds when a roll maneuver oriented the vehicle to the fin No. I down
position, The start tank is on the fin No. 1 side of the vehicle. At
first burn cutoff, the vehicle axis was _5 degrees above the local hor-
izontal. At 837 seconds, a pitch down maneuver oriented and maintained
the axis parallel to the local horizontal. Between 3207 and 5_27 seconds,
the axis was in a pitch dowu position 20 degrees below the local horizontal.
From 5_9_ seconds till engine restart at II,61_ seconds, the axis was main-
tained parallel to the 2ocal horizontal. The roll maneuvers were at the
rate of 0.3 deg//sec, and the pitch maneuvers were at the rate of 0.3 deg/sec.
The vehicle was in the san from liftoff to 3100 seconds, from 5700 to 8800
seconds, and from 11,200 seconds until restart. The vehicle was in the
earth's shadow from 3000 to 5000 seconds and from 8700 to 11,200 seconds.
In an inclined equatorial orbit such as on AS-502 flight, the greatest
total radiant heat input per orbit is to the "down" side of the vehicle
or engine, i.e., the side facing the earth. This occurs from a combina-
tion of solar radiation, earth emission, and earth albido. The greatest
instantaneous radiant heat input occurs to the side directly facing the
_RII.
O
Orbital Data
Plots of significant engine temperatures and pressures are presented in
Fig. 31 through 37. The thrust chamber jacket and nozzle temperatures
are presented in Fig. 31. The two nozzle temperatures (C0385 and CO396),
located approximately 90 degl_es apart on the bell, were stabilized
within 3000 seconds at approximately -I00 F. Their temperatures cycled
thereafter as the vehicle orbited from shadow to sunshine. The fuel in-
jection manifold temperature (C0200) was probably measuring the average
temperature of the injector body and forward manifold. After the initial
warmup, this temperature increased at a much slower rate and was -175 F
at restart.
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Included in Fig. 31 are plots of thrust chamber jacket temperature and
the two nozzle temperatures (C0385 and C0386) from vehicle AS-501 orbital
coast. As seen, there was very close correlation between these parameters
on the two flights, The temperature profiles were nearly identical through-
out the coast period.
The turbine temperatures (Fig. 32) exhibited normal decays following engine
cutoff. At the end of two orbits, these temperatures had decayed exponen-
tially to 200 _ and were not yet stabilized. Fuel and oxidizer turbine
inlet temperature from AS-501 are also included in Fig. 32 • These tem-
perature decays were nearly identical for the two flights.
Figure 33 presents plots of fuel turbine inlet manifold wall temperature
(C2013) fuel turbine exhaust manifold wall temperature (C201_), crossovcr
duct skin temperature (C2016), and the crossover duct skin temperature
from AS-501 flight. All parameters exhibited the normal exponential tem-
perature decay. As expected, the thin-walled crossover duct cooled at a
much faster rate than the others, and by 9000 seconds was approaching a
stabilized -20 F. The crossover duct temperature decay for the two flights
was nearly identical throughout the two-orbit coast period.
Start tank pressure and helium tank pressure are presented in Fig. 3_
as well as the corresponding measurements £rom vehicle AS-2Ob. The sta-
bilized start tank pressure on the two flights differed because of start
tank vent relief valve settings, which was ib00 psia on AS-20_ and 1300
psia on AS-502. The start tank temperature was -260 F at first-burn cut-
off, and had wermed up to -195 F by 10,000 seconds. At engine cutoff,
helium tank temperature was -2_0 F. Assuming helium tank and start tank
temperatures were the same after two orbits, and assumivg no helium leak,
the helium tank pressure, based upon the temperature change, was predicted
to be 1970 psia at II,000 seconds. This agreed reasonably well with the
19_0 psia measured, and indicates that no significant helium leak occurred,
MOV actuator temperature (C2003) and M0V closing control line tempersture
(C2005) from AS-501 and AS-502 are presented in Fig. 33. These temperatures
6_ R-745O-2
exhibited similar trends on both flights. The temperatures responded
more on AS-301 thnn on AS-502 to the variations in radiant heat input
from shadow to sunshine. This apparent lack of response on AS-502 is
unexplained. The longer-term temperature trends for the two flights are
similar, however; the temperatures on AS-502 are considered normal. The
closing control l_ne temperature is measuring a smaller mass temperature
and will warm up at a faster rate than the actuator temperature as shown
in Fig. 35.
The hydraulic system temperatures (Fig. 36) exhibited temperature varia-
tions during orbit. I_draulic pump inlet temperature rose from 120 de-
grees at cutoff to a maximum of 190 degrees. This is apparently due to
soakback from the oxidizer turbine exhaust mvnifold. At 9000 seconds,
the hydraulic pump inlet temperature and oxidizer turbine discharge tem-
perature were both approximately 200 F, and both temperatures decayed
from that time at approximately the same rate.
Hydraulic pump discharge temperature (C2029) and reservoir oil tempera-
ture (C0051) cycled normally d,_ring the periods of high- or low-radiation-
heat input. The sharp rise in hydraulic pump discharge temperature at
6000 seconds was coincident with the roll maneuver at 3780 seconds, which
oriented the hydraulic pump toward the sun. The other parameters of
Fig. )6 exhibit a similar increasing tendency, apparently for the same
reason.
The pitch actuator oil temperature (C0203) decayed from +20 to -_0 F at
a near steady rate throughout coast. That actuator is situated behind
many components and received comparatively little radiation. The decay
was likely the result of soakback from the cold components in the vicinity
without compensating radiant heat input.
There are no data from the AS-501 hydraulic system during orbit to make
comparisons of those temperatures.
65
Gas generator oxidizer and fuel bootstrap line temperatures are presented
in Fig. 37. The one measurement on the fuel line (C01_6) exhibited a
steady increasing trend throughout coast, and at restart the Slope of the
curve indicates the line would have eventually stabilized at a temperature
much high than -200 F. The three oxidizer bootstrap line temperatures
all began warmup immediately at engine shutdown. The rapid warmup be-
ginning at 5?00 seconds coincided with the vehicle leaving the earth's
shadow and the No. 1 down roll maneuver, which oriented the gas generator
side toward the sun for maxinum solar radiation. The chilling at 7700
seconds apparently occurred because the bootstrap line was shadowed by
some engine or vehicle component. It is inferred from these data that
a stable bootstrap line temperature, when not receiving direct solar
radiation, is approximately -50 F.
J
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ENGINE PHtFOR_.NCE ANALYSIS
I_GIN_ PERFORMANCE DECAY
Event Description
Decreasing performance in two distinct phases was observed during AS-502,
S-IVB first burn. The first decay began at 68_ seconds range time (ap-
proximately 107 seconds after engine start), and was a _-psi decrease in
main chamber pressure over 8 seconds. The second decay began at 692
seconds range time, with a 12-psi decrease in main chamber pressure occur-
ring over I0 seconds. A loss in engine c* efficiency, denoting a propel-
lant leak overboard and/or main injector damage, also was noted. No
additional shifts in performance following 702 seconds range time were
detected, and tileengine proceeded into a normal shutdown. The performance
decrease at 68_ seconds correlates with increased engine chilling attribut-
able to hydrogen leakage near the dome area (Thermal Environment section)
but the less rapid chilling of the engine over some _0 prior seconds was
not detected in performance.
Failure Hode Possibilities. The following general areas were defined as
potential sources for the AS-_029 S-INB performance shifts:
1. External propellant leakage upstream of the main engine valves
including stage ducting and prevalves
2. Mechanical failure of either turbopump
3. Gas generator propellant feed system leak
_. Start system leak
5. Hydrogen pressurization system leak
6. Main thrust chamber jacket leak
7. Main injector degradation or instability
8. ASI propellant feed system failure
v
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Hypothesis. Consideration of the above failure modes and correlation with
the observed performance decay, as well as other pertinent S-IYB anomalies,
was approached from the standpoint that the failure mode should propagate
or be a source of the engine area temperature variation phenomenon and a
potential source of restart failure. As such, the following hypothesis
was formulated and ultimately demonstrated (Verification Testing section)
as an explanation of the first-burn performance shift, thermal variations,
and a direct source for engine restart failure. The performance decay is
initially caused by progressive fuel leakage from the upper flex section
of the A$I fuel propellant feed linewhieh, after leaking overboard for
40 seconds at flows of 0.6 lb/sec c_ less,increased between 68_ and 692
seconds re_ge time to approximately 1.5 lb/sec fuel overboard, causing
the first observed decay in performance. At 692 seconds range time, the
overboard fuel leakage rate again increased, so that performance began
to decay at an increased rate, and highASI mixture ratio operation resulted.
Continually increasing flow overboard eventually led to ASI reverse flow,
cohsisting primarily of oxidizer entering through the oxidizer inlet into
the ASI cavity and flowing back out through the ASI fuel orifices. ASI
oxidizer flow for AS-502, S-IVB was restricted by the 0.125-inch-diameter
ASI oxidizer orifice and high oxidizer injector pressure drop at constant
mass flowrate which, in conjunction with some flow of fuel from the main
chamber, was sufficient to produce high-temperature backflow. The back-
flow caused burnout of %heASI fuel line at 696 seconds (first sign of
heating) and, subsequently, eroded into the ASI
essentially burning out the ASI with additional
flow overboard. By 702 seconds range time, the
tially complete, with the maxi_,m oxidizer flow
chamber backflow, and failed ASI fuel line flow
total fQel and 1.0 lb/sec total oxidizer) being
performance stabilized.
fuel orifices and body,
loss of ASI oxidizer feed
ASI body erosion was essen-
through the burned out ASI,
(approximately 4.5 lb/sec
damped overboard and the
6S
Analysis
Figure 38 depicts the observed main chamber pressure from 650 to 750 seconds
range time. The oxidizer tank stage-supplied helium pressurization flow-
rate through the engine heat exchanger also is shown because changes in
heat transfer to the oxidizer turbine exhaust gases between low and high
flow heat exchanger operation (Vehicle Analysis section) significantly
affect turbine backpressure and engine performance. The chamber pressu_'e,
normalized to constant heat exchanger flowrate (Fig. 3_, illustrates the
performance shift occurring in two decaying phases rather than abrupt per-
formance shifts. Following 702 seconds range time, the performance is
essentially stabilized with normal cutoff occurring at 7_7.0 seconds range
time. Figure %0 compares the cutoff AS-502 of S-IVB first burn with AS-501,
S-I'¢B cutoff. The cutoff impulse values at standard conditions are within
approximately 3000 ib-sec, or well within the expected engine-to-engine
variation in cutoff impulse for normal engine shutdown.
All projected failure hypotheses explaining the phenomenon represented by
Fig. 40 were judged with regard to their correlation with a single-source
point failure mode, and satisfy the following criteria:
I. The suspected failure mode must be consistent with the observed
thermal chilling and heating conditions as stated in the Stage
Hydraulic Failure During Orbital Coast section.
2. The suspected failure mode must be a reasonable match with
respect to predicted changes in engine performance resulting
from the failure mode.
3. The suspected failure mode must be a potential source for fail-
ure of the engine to restart (Engine Failure to Restart section).
_. The suspected failure mode must be verified or reasonably dupli-
cated by an engine or component test program (Verification Test-
ing section).
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All'potential failure modes, including the general areas listed in the
failure mode possibilities for the 68_ to 702 seconds range time, two-
level performance decay (summarized in Overall Failure Analysis section)
were eliminated either by dire_t verification from data of normal opera-
ti_n integrity or failure to correlate as a single-source point failure
mode with the above outlined conditions, with the exception of a failure
localized to the ASI propellant feed system. As such, the stated failure
mode hypothesis was developed in the sequence shown below.
Progressive ASI Fuel Leakage. The performance decay began with progressive
overboard leakage of fuel from the ASI fuel feed line beginning at a low
level (less than 0.6 Ib/sec) at 6_5 seconds range time. As a gross indi-
cation, the fuel system pressure loss at constant flo_Tate, the fuel pump
flow coefficient (volumetric flow divided by pump speed), as well as the
increase in main fuel injection temperature (indicating an increase in
main chamber mixtm'e ratio), all support a loss of propellant from the
fuel system downstream of the engine flowmeter beginning at 665 seconds,
increasing at 68_ seconds, and again at 692 seconds.
Fuel Leak Located Near Dome Area Section of the ASI Fuel Line. Analysis
of engine area temperature data (Thermal Environment section) conclusively
supports hydrogen leakage (i.e,, chilling to cryogenic hydrogen temp,ra-
ture) localized to the engine dome area on the fuel pump side of the engine_b
or the general area of the ASI fuel line between the instrumentation bloc_ _
eR
and the ASI fuel inlet. Figure _I, summarizing the ASI system flows based.W_
on best estimates of nominal line resistance for various break points in
either line, indicates the total ASI fuel feed system leakage between
the instrumentation block and the ASI inlet is between 2.6 and _.9 Ib/sec
with the line totally failed. Such overboard leakage is sufficient to
explain a significant portion of t_e observed performance shift.
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Fuel Leak Progresses to ASI Backflow. For the above-described propel-
lant levels to be lost overboard to explain performance, the ASI fuel
line leakage must ultimately progress to total line failure, which is
also a minimal condition to allow heating of the engine area in terms
of elevated temperature gas e_£rging from the ASI through the ASI end
of the line. As a function of the line resistance, a backflow condition
would be reached between 1._ and 2.1 lb/sec overboard, depending on the
leak location in the upper section. As leakage increases with time,
causing the performance t_ decay, the total pressure at the leak point
decreases to ASI chamber pressure, causing oxidizer entering the ASI cav-
ity to flow back through the ASI fuel injector orifices. This causes
ASI chamber pressure to approach main chamber pressure, which may then
allow positive fuel flow to the _LoI to resume.
Therefore, until the overboard ltakage becomes large enough to drop the
total pressure at the leak point below main chamber pressure, an unstable
oscillatory flow condition exists.
The leakage rate overboard also establishes the ASI operating mixture ratio,
which will increase as leakage flow increases. A high-temperature mixture
ratio in the ASI will, therefore, exist over a finite period of time prior
to and after the backflow condition is approached.
Backflow Causes ASI Burnout. Analyses further predicted that the per-
formance shift and the extended general heating on the oxidizer and fuel
side of the dome required substantial ASI erosion from high-temperature
backflow to the extent oxidizer feed flow would be in part or totally
dumped overboard, either by severence of the oxidizer line caused by heat-
ing or erosion through the ASI fuel manifold, essentially opening a direct
passage for oxidizer and thrust chamber backflow overboard.
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Figure _2 depicts the indicated thrust chamber c _ versus thrust chamber
mixture ratio before and after the total shift of 68_ to 702 seconds
range time, as determined by the PAST 6_1ALTITUDEREDUCTION program.
The e_ after the shift can deviate from the theoretical frozen equilib-
rium slope (known to be an adequate description of engine operation over
the range in question) because of loss of flow overboard downstream of
the engine flowmeters, _ich can be represented by a tgtal fuel, oxidizer,
or combination of leakage varying the mixture ratio, or by a real c# loss
because of physical degradation of the injector. As noted in the figure,
an oxidizer-only leak of 15 lb/sec or 5.5 lb/sec fuel-only leak is required
to match the theoretical slope. From Fig. bl (which charts the flows for
a total break at various points in the ASI propellant feed system) such
leakages would require, in the oxidizer case, a leak at the ASI oxidizer
valve or, in the fuel case, a leak upstream of the second ASI line flex
section. As previously discussed, an oxidizer leak only does not corre-
]ate with the indicated temperature phenomenon, i.e., the increase in
main injection temperature, and the leak magnitude is not supported by
oxidizer system pressure drops at constant mass flowrate. A fuel-only
leak does not correlate with the indicated temperature phenomenon because
the required source of leakage is well below the dome area and would pre-
dict a greater than observed increase in fuel injection temperature. A
combination leakage of primarily fuel and some oxidizer flow overboard
was, therefore, the most legitimate watch both for the c_ slope and ex-
pected fuel injection temperature rise.
Evaluation of system capacity showed that, with an intact ASI, a maximu_
flow of 3.9 lb/sec hydrogen from a total break, in the fuel ASI line up-
stream of the third flex section and 0.6 lb/sec oxidizer flow overboard
through the fuel injector orifices would require a significant loss of
c _ because of unexpected degradation of the main injector for the amount
of dwell time at high mixture ratio prior to backflow, and probably would
not provide sufficient gas temperature leaving the ASI to explain the
engine area heating. A flow, however, of 5 lb/sec hydrogen and 1.5 lb/sec
76  745o-- 
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oxidizer overboard, associated with total ASI burnout, represents the
other extreme of no loss of c* because of main injector degradation, but
would provide gas temperatures explaining the engine area heating. The
best estimate, as discussed below, of 4.5 Ib/sec hydrogen and 1.0 ib/sec
oxidizer overboard during the flight also is shown in Fig. _2.
Test Verification of Hypothesis. Figure _3depicts the predicted range of
fuel feed flo_ overboard versus time for AS-502 S-IVB in which minimum to
maximum limits were picked by matching the following sequence of events:
I. Between 645 and 68b seconds range time, a constant or gradually
increasing hydrogen leakage flow overboard between O.b and 0.6
Ib/sec would be suffic'ent to cause chilling of the engine area
without detectably affecting performance.
2. Between 68_ and 692 seconds range time, a flowrate between I.I
and 1.5 Ib/sec would be sufficient to match performance as well
as the increased chilling.
3. After 696 seconds range time, the first sign of heatin_ indicat-
ing total line failure allows overboard flow between 2.6 and
3.9 Ib/sec.
These limits resulted in the predicted mixture ratio limits shown in
Fig. 44 for the A5-502 flight which wire utilized t_ program a simulated
test at SSFL on engine J01(>-_ (Verification Testing _ection). The most
important factors of the failure hypothesis to be verified or disproved
by the test were the following:
lo How much potential main injector damage would result because
of the highASI mixture ratio operation predicted between
approximately 690 and 696 secovds range time before total
fuel line failure?
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_o Would the mixture ratio of the backflow gases be sufficient
to continue ASI erosion to the point of burnout, allowing loss
of oxidizer overboard? This was the most critical aspect of
the hypothesis to _.everified because previous tests simulating
S-II conditions _i.e., ASI oxidizer orificing and ASI oxidizer
injector pressure drop) tended to show the oxidizer supply flow
dominated the flow back out of the ASI fuel injector orifices,
with the ASI fuel supply totally removed so that mixture ratio
was so high that the gas flow was below eroding temperature.
As summarized in the Verification Testing section, the physical sequence
of events hypothesized for AS-502 S-IVB were verified. Figure A5 summar-
izes the performance during the high mixture ratio operation of the R&D
test engine (J016-_). Main injector erosion prior to backflow simulation
produced no detectable effect on performance. Following hot-gas dump
valve opening (simulated line failure), the continued erosion of the in-
jector and ASI assembly caused a total loss in performance over 12 seconds
of 8 psi in main chamber pressure. Although heating of the engine flight
instrumentation packages because of the subsequent fire tends to reduce
the quality of the data, calculation of the maximum backflow from the
burned out ASI is sufficient to explain only part of the performance loss.
The additional loss is attributed to a c* efficiency degradation of the
main injector of approximately 0.5 percent because of the damage (described
in the Verification Testing section), which was incurred during the test.
Based onthe engine JO16-_ test results, it is expected that the total fuel
flow overboard for AS-502 S-IVSwas approximately _.5 Ib/sec. This includes
approximately _ Ib/sec from the failed fuel feed line which, based on SSFL
results, would have been burned _ff upstream of the third flex section
once complete backflow is established, and 0.5 Ib/sec thrust chamber fuel
backflow. Although the oxidizer feed line was not severed, the ASI fuel
manifold burnout would have permitted approximately 1.0 Ib/sec oxidizer
overboard. It is expected that some real c* efficiency loss in the main
injector also was incurred, as indicated in Fig. _2.
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Performance
An integral part of the development of the AS-502 S-IVB hypothesis was
consideration of the observed shifts and correlation with the various fail-
ure modes projected to expected performance parameter changes (i.e., char_es
in flows, speeds, pressure, and temperatures). A good deal of effort
(Computer Model Gains section) was directed toward refinement of this
technique in terms ef analytical model development based on empitic.l data
from engine test. Utilizing the appropriate gain factors from the Computer
Model Gains section, Table 2 compares thc actual changes in performance
between 68% and 702 seconds range time and predicted values for _.5 lb/sec
hydrogen and 1.0 lb/sec oxidizer flow overboard from the ASI system. The
predicted values for an oxidizer line failure just upstream of the restrictor
orifice (9.5 lb/sec) was included for comparison, The observed flight data
for fuel flow and speed were corrected for the observed in-run performance
trend typically present on all engines. The table shows the projected
overboard flows for the hypothesized failure mode are a reasonable approx-
imation of the shift and a total oxidizer failure is again a poor corre-
lation. Table 3 compares the J016-h shift performance with the AS-502
S-IVB data corrected for zero ASI fuel feed flow overboard using the per-
formance gains. A close agreement is shown in the table, indicating the
likelihood of injector degradation similar to engine J016-_ present during
flight.
Therefore, it is concluded from the data presented in the two tables that
the sequence of events leading to the above total propellant loss over-
board, with some c* loss because of injector damage predicted for the AS-S02
S-IVB flight failure mode, is a totally adequate explanation of the observed
performance phenomenon.
............... i ,
TABLE 2
AS-502 S-IVB PERFOtL_ANCESHIFT PREDICTIONS
Parameter
Fuel Pump Discharge
Discharge Pressure, psia
Oxidizer Pump Discharge
Pressure, psia
Gas Generator Chamber
Pressure, psia
Main Chamber Pressure,
psia
Main Fuel Injector
Temperature, F
Fuel Flow_, gpm
Oxidizer Flow, gpm
Fuel Speed*, rpm
Oxidizer Speed, rpm
Fuel Turbine Inlet
Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet
Temperature, F
Observed
J2042 Engine Decay
(first-burn
68_-702)
ASI Fuel Line
Failure and
ASI Burnout
(_.5 lb/sec_
1.0 Ib/sec LO2
overboard)
ASI Oxidizer Line
Failure Only
(15 Ib/sec L02
overboard)
_2b,.7
-21.5
-.10.0
-16.2
+6._
+15.7
-6.9
-126
-71.2
-1.2
-5.5
-20.2
-17.9
-8.8
-13.5
+6.0
+28.3
-8.1
-9_
-56.0
-5.5
-5.2
-25.5
-37.5
-16.5
-19.5
-_,.5
-60.0
0
-15o
-90.0
-31.5
-30.9
*Corrected for in-test trend prior to and after shift
8_ R-7_5o-_
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TABI_
AS-502 S-IYB FERF0_E SHIFT PREDICTIONS
Paramgter
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure, psia
Oxidizer Pump Discharge
Pressure, psia
Gas Generator Chamber
Pressure, psia
Main Chamber Pressure, psia
Main Fu_l Injection Temperature, F
Fuel Flow, gpm
Oxidizer Flow, gpm
Fuel Speed, rpm
Oxidizer Speed: rpm
Fuel Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet
Temperature, F
S-IVB
684-702 Shift
Corrected to Zero
ASI Fuel Feed
Flow Overboard
-8
-8
-3
-3
0
-I0
-3
-50
-20
-I
-3
Engine J016-4
(SSFL 313-0_I)
Shift With Zero
ASI Fuel Feed
Flow 0verboard
-12
-ii
-6
-8
-1
-10
-5
--3o
-18
-7
-3
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C0_xIPUTI_ HODEL AND _NGI_E PERFORMANCE GAIN FACTORS
Summary of $SFL Tests
Ob,jectives. Tests 313-O31, -032, and -033 were accomplished on 18 and
19 April 1968. The primary objective of these tests was to assess the
influence of a high and abrupt fuel repressurizing flow change on engine
performance.
Test 313.03_ was accomplished on 19 April 1968. The object of the test
was to simulate a break in the ASI oxidizer line downstream of the orifice,
and to determine its effect on engine operation.
Test 313-033 was run on 21 April 1968. The primary test objective was to
simulate a axtial failure and then a complete failure of the ASI fuel
line and its effect on engine operation and hardware.
Results. The engine was calibrated to a level corresponding to engine J20_.
Test 313.-031 was accomplished as planned. At 73 seconds, fuel repressur-
izing valve signalled open. Engine performance shifted with no hardware
damage. Fuel repressurizing flowrate was 5.1 Ib/sec.
Test 313-032 did not accomplish test objectives because the facility fuel
repressurizing overboard dump valve failed to respond to its opening signal.
The test was terminated to conserve eugine time.
Test 313-033 was accomplished as planned. At 73 seconds, fuel repressur-
izing valve signalled open. Engine performance shifted with no hardware
damage. Fuel repressurizing flowrate was 8._ Ib/sec.
Test 313-03_. simulated ASI oxidizer line failure. As oxidizer leak was
observed in the facility hot-gas dump system at 27.07 seconds. The oxi-
dizer leak in the hot-gas dump system increased so that oxidizer flow to
;0-2
ASI apparently stopped at 53.72 seconds; at 122 seconds, ASI oxidizer flow
reversal resulted in combustion in ASI hot-gas dump. Performance gain data
from the test was not usable because of the indeterminate gradual leak.
Data from an MTF test on engine J201_, which had an ASI oxidizer line fail-
ure, was used for comparison.
Test 313-035 was accomplished as planned. The test simulated a partial
failure and then a complete failure of rheAS1 fuel line. The engine
operated for 95 seconds with the ASI fuel system in the failed "mode."
In addition to 313-033, test 62_-062 on engine JO18 (31 August 1965) was
used. During the test, the ASI fuel line partially failed. The leak on
62_-062 was estimated to be 0.5 lb/sec.
Comparison of SSFL Gains to Existing Model
The J-2 data reduction program and influence coefficient model were used
to simulate performance shifts encountered during SSFL tests. The per-
formance shifts predicted by the J-2 model did not agree with performance
shifts obtained during SSFL tests. Tables 4 through 6 compare the model
with the SSFL, _ffF, and engine JO18 gains at constant flo_rates. Table
shows the engine gains for _nASI fuel leak. Table 5 shows the engine
gains for an AS] oxidizer leak (MTF test u_ed instead of SSFL test).
Table 6 shows the engine gains for a fuel pressurization leak. In all
fuel leakage cases, the J-2 model did not agree closely with the hot-fire
gains; oxidizer leakage gains were close to model predictions. Table 7
shows the effect on performance of fuel leakages less than 0._ lb/sec.
It should be noted that the magnitude of change is within signal noise
level for flight data.
s7
TABLE 4
J-2 ENGINE GAINS FOR FUEL TANK PRESSURIZATION LINE FAILD]_E
Engine Parameter
Fuel Tapoff Flow, lb/sec
Main Chamber Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Fuel Manifold Pressure, psi
Fuel I_jection Pressure, psi
Fuel Injection Temperature, F
Main Fuel Flow, gpm
Main Oxidizer Flow, gpm
Fuel Pump Speed, rpm
Oxidizer Pump Speed, rpm
Gas Generator Chamber Pressure, psi
Fuel Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Fuel Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Model
1
-3.1
-2.9
-3.0
-4.1
-4.3
-3.1
8.1
0.7
-16+6
-9.2
-I._
0.6
-0.I
Engine JO0_-_
Test Test
315-031 315-033
1 1
-2.3 -2.9
-2.9 -2.9
-2.9 -2.6
-1.7 -2.0
-1.7 -2.0
-3.1 -3._
0.5 0.5
-1.9 -2.9
1.9 2.3
-9.8 -16.5
-9.8 -8.8
-1.3 -I.I
-!.3 -2.0
-0.9 -l.1
-0.I -0.1
_8
+:
J
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TABLE 5
J-2 ENGIRE GAINS F0R ASI OXIDIZER LINE FAILURE
Engine Parame%er
ASI Oxidizer Leak Flow, lb/sec
Main Chamber Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Fuel Manifold Pressure, psi
Fuel Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Injectinn Temperature, F
Main Fuel Flow, gpm
Rain Oxidizer Flow, gpm
Fael Pump Speed, rpm
Oxidizer Pump Speed, rpm
Gas Generator Chamber Pressure, psi
Fuel Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Fuel Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
ASI Oxidizer
Line Failure
Engine
Model J2014
I I
-I.I -1.3
-2.3 -2.5
-:..9 -1.5
-1.7 -1.7
-1.6 --
-1.2 -1.5
-- -0.3
-4.5 -4. o
0.5 o
-17, 9- -!0.0
-7.3 -6.0
-0.9 -1.1
-1.7 -2.1
-0.9 --
-1.2 --
-0.1 --
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TABL_ 7
J-2 ENGINE GAINS FOR ASI FUEL LINE FAILURE
Engine Parameter
ASI Fuel Leak Flow, lb/sec
Engine J018,
Test 62_-062
0.5
(estimated)
Main Chamber Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Fuel Manifold Pressure, psi
Fuel Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Injection Temperature, F
Flain Fuel Flow, gpm
Hain Oxidizer Plow, gpm
Fuel Pump Speed, rpm
Oxidizer Pump Speed, rpm
Gas Generator Chamber Pressure, psi
Fuel Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
_eA Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
-1.5
-2.0
-2.0
-2.0
-2.0
2.0
-I0.0
0
-20.0
-5.0
-6.0
Engine
J004-5,
Test 513-035
O.t_
-I.I
-1.9
-i.6
-i.0
-1.9
-1.9
0
15.0
0
15.o
-7.0
0
-5.0
--2.6
-0.2
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J-2 Model Evaluation
A study was made to determine the validity of the J-2 models. To determine
possible problem arca_ with the J-2 model, engine hardware characteristics
were compared over a PU excursion. The differences in hardware character-
istics over the PU range were averaged to determine if a bias existed.
The thrust chamber jacket £ P, the oxidizer injector _ P, and the fuel
injector £ P showed to be areas of significant bias.
Table 8 shows the results of the thrust chamber jacket _ P study. Data
for a fuel pressurization change, ASI fuel leak, PU excursion, and large
engine recalibrations were tabulated. The influence coefficient program
and data reduction program were used to predict the thrust chamber pres-
sure drop at the higher flowrate from the tabulated data. Tabulated is
the error that resulted in predicting the jacket pressure drop for the
various models. The influence coefficient program was as good as any of
the methods studied. Apparently, a parameter not used by any of the models
is responsible for the errors observed.
Tables 9 and 10 show the results of a similar study for the fuel and oxi-
dizer injector study. The iufluence coefficient program appears to be
best for prediction of the fuel injector pressure drop. A modification
of the influence coefficient model using flow raised to the 1.66 power
best predicts the oxidizer injector pressure drop.
Table 8 indicates that the influence coefficient model is in error by
23.7 psi for an ASI fuel leak of 3.5 pounds. This 23.7-psi error is
approximately 6 percent of the total thrust chamber jacket pressure drop.
The change in the influence coefficient gains were calculated for a ±6-
percent error in thrust chamber resistance, and are presented in Table 11.
The +6-percent gains for a 3.5-1b/sec fuel leak are in better agreement
with the gains from engine J004-5. This shows that Tables 8 through I0
can be used to helF_pY+edict reasonable gains by modifying the J-2 model
gains by the error indicated.
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TABLE
EFFECT OF 3.5-I_
Chamber Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Oxidizer Injection Pressure, psi
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure, psi
Fuel Manifold Pressure, psi
Fuel Injection Pressure, psi
._ain Fuel Flow, gpm
Main Oxidizer Flow, gpm
Oxidizer Pump Speed, rpm
Fuel Pump Speed, rpm
Gas Generator Chamber Pressure, psi
Fuel Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Fuel Turbine Inlet Temperature, F
Oxidizer Turbine Inlet Pressure, psi
Oxidizer T_rbine Inlet Temperature, F
II
/$EC FUEL
Influence Coefficient
Error
Thrust Chamber
Resistance
-6
percent
+6
percent
Engine
JO0_-5,
Test 313-035
-z1.56
-_. 3zk
-zi. 3_
-35.0
-38.2
-7.3
+216._
+0.3
-13.8
+62.1
-_./t6
-4.25
+h3.7
-0.48
+35.3
-6.6
-6.5
-6.5
-27.5
-29.7
-11.1
+150.0
+0.6
-20.8
+26.7
-_.6
-h._,
+28.6
-0.5
+23.2
-8.6/t
-8.66
-8.66
-20. I
-21.2
-I_..9
+83.6
+0.9
-27.8
-8.7
-4.7h
-_.55
+13.5
-0.52
+ll.1
-I0
-13
-I0
-15
-17
-12
+23
-_
-60
-6
-5
-2
-0.9
-2
@
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Tests at SSFL have shown that the J-2 model cannot precisely predict all
performance changes due to propellant leakage. Tables 8 through 10 indi-
cate the precision of the various models for some types of engine changes.
The problem areas have been defined and action initiated toward improving
the model. In the interim, computer model programs should be considered
as general indicators only of failure modes; actual engine tests are
required for confirmation.
97/9s
I I! I
GAS G_TOR TE_IPERATURE SURGE AT FIRST-BI_ CUTOFF
EVENT DESCRIPTION: FUEL TIRBI_E INLET TEMPERATURE
OVERSHOOT AFTER FIRST-BI_N CUTOFF
Defining Data
A 100 F temperature overshoot (Fig. b6), as _easured by the fuel turbine
inlet temperature bulb, occurred 2 seconds after cutoff (799 seconds
range time).
Possible Failure Modes or Causes of Event
Possible causes were:
i. Improver closing of the C_valve
2. Residual oxygen in purge system due to a leaking GG oxidizer
purge or oxidizer dome purge check valve
3. Improper sequencin? of stage-supplied GG fuel purge
9. A density change of the oxygen entrapped in the GG oxidizer
purge and GG oxidizer injection pressure lines due to chilling
of the lines
Conclusions
The most probable cause of the temperature overshoot was a quality and
density change of the oxygen entrapped in the GG oxidizer purge system
(brought about by chilling of the purge and GG oxidizer injection pres-
sure lines during engine operation and subsequent injection of the more-
dense oxygen into the GG following engine cutoff).
Improper sequencing of the stage-supplied GG fuel purge may have had a
contributory effect to the temperature overshoot. However, another
a
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serious consequence of the improper purge sequence could have been the
degradation of the GG fuel injection system due to icing. This problem
could prevent a successful restart (although GG operation at restart
was proper). Corrective action must be taken on future S-IVB flights
to prevent recurrence of the stage purge sequencing problem.
The inadequacy of the 66 fuel purge did not contribute to the failure
of the engine to restart.
No hardware damage was sustained by the fuel turbine as a result of the
temperature overshoot.
Analysis
The analysis indicates that:
le
o
o
4.
The high temperature occurred when C_ chamber pressure (and
mass flowrate) was low, thus minimizing the heat input to the
turbine.
No apparent damage was sustained by the fuel turbine as a re-
sult of the temperature overshoot. Normal spinup of the pumps
was noted during subsequent restart attempt.
Gas generator valve operation was normal at cutoff.
Stage sequencing of the turbopump and 66 fuel purge occurred 7
seconds later than programmed (0.1 second prior to cutoff),
such that purge pressure was not up to the required level at
cutoff. This _u_ge is required to be at operating pressure
(82 to 130 psia) at the customer connect panel withon 0.2
second of engine cutoff.
Figure 47 depicts the engine pump purge regulator pressure
buildup at cutoff. The data revealed that the highest pressure
level attained during the purge was below the minim_n required
limit (6 psi low). This has been brought to the attention of
the S-IVB stage contractor (Huntington Beach Facility).
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The inadequacy of the GG fuel purge did not contribute to the
failure of the engine to restart.
Pressure profiles of GG oxidizer injection pressure at cutoff
for AS-502 S-IVB flight and stage acceptance were compared. The
data did not indicate any significant deviations that would relate
the temperature overshoot to a leaking check valve in the GG oxi-
dizer purge system. However, severe chilling in the vicinity of
the GG throughout much of the first burn suggested the following
explanation for the temperature overshoot:
a.
be
The GG oxidizer purge and instrumentation lines (shown by
dash marks in Fig. _8) chilled down to liquid oxygen tem-
peratures. This assumption is reasonable on the basis of
the HO¥ closing control line temperature measurement--
located within inches of the purge lines--which indicated .
a temperature below -260 F for better than 30 seconds prior
to engine cutoff.
Gaseous oxygen entrapped in the lines became more dense and
probably reached liquid state. The volume of the rJG purge
and GG oxidizer injection pressure lines is approximately
3.3 times greater than the volume of the GO oxidizer manifold.
Calculated results showed that it is possible to trap approx-
imately 0.115 pound of oxygen if the entire line volumes
in Fig. b8 were filled with liquid.
c. When cutoff occurred, the engine supplied helium purge in-
jected the more-dense oxygen into the GG combustor. With
the GG valve closed and burning of residual oxygen and fuel
from the GG injector manifolds taking place, the additional
oxygen supplied via the purge lines momentarily raised the
mixture ratio in tbe GG sufficiently to produce the tempera-
ture overshoot.
No further problems of this nature are expected on future S-IVB
flights siuce corrective actions are being implemented to eliminate
the cause of the abnormal engine chilldown experienced AS-502
8-I_.
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VLINE " 93 X 0.03 - 2.79 IN. 3
VOXIDIZER HANIFOLD " 0.9 IN. 3
VT - 3.88 IN. 3
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A - n'IO'lS )z
c 4 - 0.735 (0.038) = 0.03 IN. 2
VOLUME RELATIONSHIP:
GAS GENERATORFUEL HANIFOLD TO GAS GENERATOROXIDIZER HANIFOLD - 25:1
GAS GENERATOROXIDIZER PURGE AND GAS GENERATOROXIDIZER INJECTION PRESSURE
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Figure _8. Gas Generator Oxidizer Purge System Schematic
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Fb_L PU_tP DISCHARGE PRESSI_E SURGE AFTER FIRST-BURN CUTOFF
EVENT DESCRIPTION: FUEL PRESSURE SURGE
Supporting Data
Fourteen seconds after the engine cutoff of the S-IVB first burn, a surge
occurred in fuel pump discharge pressure. The magnitude of the spike
exceeded 150 psia and conceivably could cause damage to the fuel recircu-
lation return system. Figure 49 is a plot of fuel pump discharge pressure
during the period following engine cutoff showing the anomaly as it appeared
in the flight data. Also, similar fuel pump discharge pressure data from
simulated altitude tests at AEDC are superimposed to illustrate similarity
of pressure surges observed in ground test data.
possib_!e Cause of Events
Because the J-2 fuel turbopump normally continues to coast at a relatively
high rate of speed for up to 5 minutes after cutoff, a substantial quantity
of kinetic energy remains available in the turbopump during this period.
If liquid hydrogen of adequate quality is permitted to enter the pump
while it is still spinning, a discharge pressure surge of considerable
magnitude will be produced until the pump stalls. The phenomenon appears
as a spike in fuel pump discharge pressure.
Conclusion
A pressure spike produced in this manner could possibly jeopardize the
integrity of the recirculation return system of the S-IVB stage because
it occurs after the engine bleed valves have reopened. The possibility
of a serious pressure spike is minimized if the stage prevalve and re-
circulation discharge valve are closed during the cutoff sequence, as
was done during the flight of AS-501. No relationship was established
between this pressure spike anomaly and the major AS-502 flight malfunctions.
!
!
!
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Although the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation has been advised to return to
the prevalve sequencing utilized on AS-501, rather than leaving these
valves open as was done on the AS-502 vehicle, AEDC data indicate that
closing the prevalve and recirculation discharge valve at cutoff does
not guarantee that a surge will not be produced. Figure 49 shows two
AEDC tests which had a surge even though the prevalve and recirculation
discharge valve were closed immediately after cutoff.
ANALYSIS
Figure 50 is a schematic of the fuel feed and recirculation system. At
AS-502 cutoff, the fuel prevalve and recirculation discharge (chilldown)
valve remained open. The engine bleed valve opens about _ seconds after
cutoff.
After cutoff, the fuel pump continues to turn for 15 seconds (Fig. 51).
_ith cutoff signal, the fuel pmnp inlet temperature increases (as gaseous
conditions are reached), while the fuel t auk outlet temperature remains
cold (liquid), as shown in Fig. 52 . Nhen liquid re-enters the engine,
a pressure surge results.
The NPSH at the fuel pump inlet after cutoff is shown in Fig. 53 . This
is an indicator of fuel quality (a positive value is subcooled liquid).
At the time of the surge, the NPSH at the pump inlet becomes sufficient
for the pump to develop head again with its remaining speed. Therefore,
it is thought that a gas bubble forms at the pump inlet after cutoff
and, when this bubble collapses, liquid again is introduced to the pump.
The problem is associated with the fuel feed and recirculation systems
and it has been seen on the S-IVB battleship stand at AEDC (Fig. _9).
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Conclusi._s and Reeo-_ndations
A potential problem exists if this pressure surge should exceed structural
limitations in the recircul_tion return system. Following are the existing
proof press,_'e ].evels for the various sections of the engine and stage
fuel recirculation return system:
Engine Bleed Valve Discharge Flange, psig
Engine Fuel Bleed Line, psig
Stage Recirculation Return Line, psig
II0
225
2OO
Existing engine hardware is capable of considerably higher pressure rating
without redesign. To ensure safe operation in the future it it recommended
that one of the following actions be taken:
1
_e
Resequence the engine bleed valves to prevent opening for 30
seconds after cutoff. This would require a change in the pneu-
matic system bleed orifice.
Uprate and re-identify the engine bleed valve and bleed line
by raising proof pressure to 600 psig. No hardware redesign
would be required on the engine. However, the stage recir-
culation return line might require redesign.
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S-IVB AUXILIARY HYDRAULIC PUMP FAIl/RE
DURING ORBITAL COAST
EVENT_S_I_ION
Supporting Data
During the S-IVB restart preparations sequence, when the auxiliary hydraulic
pump was commanded on, the pump failed to produce the normal discharge pres-
sure and flow. Proper current and v.ltage drops indicated normal pump rota-
tion. Figure 5_ is a schematic of the $-IVB hydraulic system.
Possible Failure Modes
In the process of analyzing this anomaly, the following potential failure
modes were considered:
i. Hydraulic pump failure
2. Hydraulic system line bre_mge
3. Hydraulic fluid freezing in the low- and/or high-pressure
system lines
Conclusion
In view of the low-temperature environment that occurred during the first
burn of the J-2 engines as a result of cryogenic leakage, the most logical
cause of the hydraulic pump failure appears to be freezing of hydraulic
fluid because of impingement of cryogenics on hydraulic system lines and/or
hoses. Laboratory test data support this hypothesis, and the flight anom-
aly was reproduced by the S-IVB:_tage contractor, McDonnell-Douglas Corpora-
tiou, during their special test program. The hydraulic pump anomaly was
a result rather than a cause, of the J-2 engine anomalies.
|
=|
II I
_LYSIS
,¢
When flight data analysis indicated that cryogenic chilling was a likely
cause of the auxiliary hydraulic pump anomaly, the stage contractor con-
ducted a series of laboratory tests to simulate the effects of cryogenic
chilling on their hydraulic system. They were able to reproduce the anom-
aly qulte conclusively by chilling (with liquid nitrogen) sections of hy-
draulic system tubing and hosing externally with LN2 while pumping hydrau-
lic oil through at the operating system flowrate (0.2 gpm).
The pumping continued normally under the environment with only a relatively
small drop in hydraulic fluid temperature (approximately 35 F) after 5 min-
utes of operation. When the liquid nitrogen flow and hydraulic fluid flow
were terminated, the flight anomaly was reproduced. The hydraulic fluid
remaining in the test specimen dropped rapidly in temperature and froze.
In the case of the tubing, the temperature of the fluid dropped below
-180 F after a _-minute period. The test of the hydraulic system hosing
produced a fluid temperature of -153 F after a b-I/2-_inute period.
Removal of latent heat from hydraulic system hardware accounts for the
blockage incurred during the flight of AS-502, as evidenced by lack of
pump discharge pressure from the auxiliary hydraulic pump when it was
turned on during second-burn preparations, as well as lack of discharge
pressure from the main hydraulic pump during the attempted engine start
transient. Although temperature measurements are not available to pin-
point the exact location of the freezing, it is most likely to have occurred
in any or all three o _. the hydraulic system lines (Fig. 5_) that cross the
gimbal plane, running from the main hydraulic pump (mounted on the j_o
engine oxidizer pump) to the accumulator reservoir and auxiliary hydraulic
pump (both mounted on the S-IVB thrust cone). The two low-pressure lines
would be most sensitive to low temperature because approximately -90 F
would cause sufficient slushiness of fluid to result in pump cavitation.
ENGINEFAILURETO RESTART
DESCRIPTION
During the flight of AS-502, the S-IVB engine (J2042) failed to restart
after a two-orbit coast. The primary events are listed below:
Even_____t
1. Engine restart command
2. M0V closing control line temperature begins to
indicate abnormal chilling
"_. _TDV control signal
4. _h. _hamber pressure fails to rise normally
5. Engine cutoff connnand
Range Time,
seconds
11,614.671
11,617
11,622.678
11,623.2
11,63o.397
The engine conditions prior to restart were within the allowable limits
on all parameters. These conditions are listed in the Vehicle Analysis,
Test Conditions section.
Specific data on the external chilling, beginning 2 seconds after engine
restart command, are presented and discussed in the Thermal Environment
section. It was evident that the Chilling did not occur prior to engine
start signal and did occur prior to STDV signal.
The thrust chamber and fuel injection temperatures indicate that the
8-second fuel lead was normal. Figure 55 shows these temperatures on
AS-502 and fuel injection temperature on AS-501.
Start tank discharge valve position, start tank pressure, pump speeds,
main flows, and pump discharge pressures all indicated that the start
tank blowdown and turbo_ump acceleration were normal. The pump discharge
pressures from AS-502 are compared with those of AS-501 in Fig. 56.
1
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Gas generator chamber pressure and fuel turbine inlet temperature both
indicated normal gas generator ignition took place. These parameters
are compared with AS-501 in Fig. 57.
The main oxidizer position indicated proper valve actuation, but main
chamber pressure did not respond normally when the main oxidizer valve
moved to the first position. Main chamber pressure normally rises from
6 or 7 psia, which it attains during the fuel lead, to approximately
50 psia when the main oxidizer valve moves to the first position (I_
degrees). 0hAS-502 restart, main chamber pressure was only I0 psia.
Hain chamber pressure continued to increase gradually, reaching 38 psia
2 seconds after STI)V. Figure 58 illustrates a normal chamber pressure
transient (AS-501) and the abnormal one experienced on AS-502.
Normally, after the main oxidizer valve opens and main propellant igni-
tion has occurred, the main fuel injection temperature increases from
liquid hydrogen temperatures to the mainstage operating temperature
(approximately-280 F), as it did on AS-501 (see Fig. 55). On AS-502,
the fuel injection temperature remained below -AI5 F from STDVuntil
cutoff.
Fuel tt_bine inlet temperature normally approaches 1050 F at nominal
PU and 1200 F at maximum thrust (full-closed PU valve), as it does for
AS-501 in Fig. 57 • On AS-502, the fuel turbine inlet temperature
initially rose to I_60 F quite rapidly, showing quicker response than
this resistance bulb normally does. This may have been caused by the
excessive gas generator temperature that resulted from the abnormal
start. Fuel turbine inlet temprrature remained excessive for the dura-
tion of the second burn, pegging upscale at 1800 F 300 milliseconds prior
to cutoff. Comparing Fig. 55 and 560 it can be seen that fuel turbine
inlet temperature follows the same trend as the differential between
oxidizer pump discharge pressure and fuel pump discharge pressure.
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From 2 to 5 seconds after STDV, all engine pressures gradually decreased
to the point where main chamber pressure was 55 psia, oxidizer pump dis-
charge pressure was 122 psia, and fuel pump discharge pressure was llO
psia. During this period, oxidizer flow _as 250 lb/sec and fuel flow was
60 Ib/sec.
At 5 seconds after $Tl)V, the PUvalve was signalled closed and oxidizer
flow began to increase. Engine pressures increased until chamber pressure
was 38 psia, oxidizer pump discharge pressure was 150 psia, and fuel pump
discharge pressure was 120 psia at 7.6 seconds after STDV, at which time
the engine received a catoff signal.
_hen a timer in the instrumentation unit expired (set for engine start
plus approximately 15 seconds), the instrumentation unit checked on the
status of the engine "mainstage 0K" pressure switches and the vehicle
acceleration, found that neither indicated positive thrust, and signalled
the engine to shut down.
POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES
The following is a list of the most suspect failure modes that could have
caused a failure to restart:
122
I. Fuel pump stall
2. Fuel pump cavitation
3. Oxidizer pump cavitation
_. Failure to bootstrap
a. Gas generator ignition failure
b. Insufficient power from start tank blowdown
5. Non-ignition of thrust chamber
a. ASI ignited
b. ASI not ignited
R-7_50-2
ANALYSIS
Fuel Pump Stall
Fuel pump discharge pressure (head) and flow indicated normal fuel pump
operation; therefore, the possibility of fuel pump stall was eliminated
as a suspect.
Fuel Pump Cavitation
Fuel pump inlet pressure and temperature were within the allowable limits,
indicating propellant quality was satisfactory. Fuel pump discharge
pressure did not indicate cavitation was occurring; therefore, the pos-
sibility of fuel pump cavitation was eliminated.
Oxidizer Pump Cavitation
Oxidizer pump inlet pressure and temperature were within the allowable
limits, indicating propellant quality was satisfactory. Oxidizer plunp
discharge pressure indicated cavitation was not occurring, thereby
eliminating oxidizer pump cavitation as a possibility.
Failure to Bootstrap
Gas Generator Ignition Failure. Gas generator chamber pressure and fuel
,urbine inlet temperature both indicated normal gas generator ignition
(Fig. _. Consequently, gas _enerator ignition failure was eliminated
as a suspect.
Insufficient Spin Power. Prior to restart, start tank pressure was 1325
psia and start tank temperature indicated -207 F. It is believed that
the actual start tank temperature was considerably colder, but se!f heat-
ing of the resistance bulb raised the indicated temperature to -207 F.
_hese measurements show that star% tank energy was adequate. Oxidizer
and fuel pump speeds reached values of 3650 and 1_,_00 rpm, respectively,
from the start tank erergy, which is more than adequate for a satisfactory
B-7_50-2 123
start. Pump speeds are sho_ in Fig. 59. Insufficient power from the
start tank _ss ruled out as a possible failure mode.
Non-Ignition of Thrust Chamber
ASI I_nited. The possibility of the ASX being properly ignited but failing
to ignite the main chamber was eliminated for two reasons. First, this
failure has never occurred during J-2 engine tests. Second, a failure of
this type does not exp]ain the first-burn abnormalities discussed in earlier
sections.
ASI Did Not Ignite. The possibility of the thrust chamber failure to ignite
because the ASI failed to ignite remains the prime suspect. It has been
shown earlier that an ASI fuel line failure best explains the external
temperature phenomena and the performance shifts.
A failed ASI fuel line would prevent fuel from entering the ASI injector,
thereby preventing ASI ignition. This failure mode would explain the
chilling of the M0V control line, beginning after engine start and prior
to STI)V on the restart, because the ASI fuel supply (main fuel valve)
opens at engine start.
®
Several other failtwes that cr _d have resulted in failure of the ASI to
ignite are: failure of the spark exciters, failure of the spark plugs
because of icing, failure of the ASI oxidizer line, blockage of either
ASI propellant line, and the ASI oxidizer valve failing to open. All
five of these were eliminated as possible single-point failure modes be-
cause they could not explain the external chilling or the performance
shift.
The ASI oxidizer valve open switch picked up properly, indicating satis-
factory valve operation. Although spark exciter performance could not be
definitely verified, it is presumed to have been satisfactory by the fol-
lowing reasoning. The No. 1ASI spark current driver and spark exciter
are supplied from the same power source as the No. 1 gas generator apa_k
current driver and spark exciter. Similarly, the No. 2 systems are supplied
R-7650-2
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from the same source. Because the gas generator ignited r rerly, it is
evident that at least one of the ASI spark current driwrs aad a power
input. _ any event, it would take a complex multiple failure to ob-
tain gas generator sparks without obtaining power to the ASI spark exciters.
®
Results of the S-IVB failure simulation test (Verification Testing section)
indicated the spark plug electrodes can be severly damaged as a result of
ASI erosion occurring during and after an ASI f_,.elline failure. It is
conceivable that ASI oxidizer and main injector fuel could mix in the
ASI, but not ignite because of spark ping electrode damage preventing
adequate spark.
Shutdown
Even though the ASI and main chamber did not ignite, a safe engine shut-
down occurred without the main propellants igniting from the hot turbine
exhaust gas.
CONCLUSION
Engine restart was not a_hieved because of non-igniti,m of the ASI, which
is necessary to ignite the main chamber. The ASI failed to ignite because
the ASI fuel line had failed during the first burn.
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0VL_ALL FAILURE ANALYSIS
To ensure that all possible failure modes were investigated, each of the
major components in each engine subsystem was evaluated _'ith respect to
the flight data and the possii,le failure modes. Table 12 iists the engine
systems and e_.mponents, the potential failure modes associated with each
component, and the five _najor abnormalities of tile flight: first-burn
external chilling, external heating, restart external :'hilling, perform-
anceanee shifts, and the failure to restart. In these eohmms, an X is
placed if the flight data and analysis indicate the failure mode in
column 2, on the component in column 1, does no____texplain tile column head-
ing in columns 3 through 7. The last column contains an X if the data
verified normal operation. This column is used only for components that
can be related to a specific performance parameter, i.e., valve operations,
turbine efficiencies, pump efficiencies, and injector efficieneies. From
this table, it is possible to locale the prime suspect by finding tile
component and failure mode for which no X could be supplied. The ASI
fuel line external leak is the only one in tills category.
Table 15 lists the instrumentation parameters that failed during the
flight.
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TABLE 13
B-IVB INSTRD4ENTATION FAILURES
MEAS_T
NUMBER
000O8
00010
00012
00123
O0050
00151
00202
00231
02036
00003
00013
00058
0022_
EO209
E0210
TITLE
Heat Exchanger Helium Inlet Temp.
Engine AreaAmbient Temp.
GGFuel Bleed Valve Temp.
Aft Interstage Temp.
Fuel Pump Wall Temp.
0xid. Pump Wall Temp.
hox Pump Bearing Colant Temp.
Fuel Tank Pressurization Module
Inlet Tamp.
GG Bootstrap Line Temp.
Lox Pump In Pr
H2 Tapoff Orifice 0utlet Pr
PU Calve Inlet Pr
Fuel Pump Interstage Pr
Lox Dome Accelerometer
Fuel Pump Lateral Accelercmeter
j..
COI_.fE_S
Recorder Failed
Pegged Throughout Coast, Burned
Out at Tr - 700 Sac.
Pegged _,roughout Coast, Wrong
Range for Coast Data
Data Not Valid During Coast
Data Not Valid During Coast
Data Not Valid During Coast
Pegged During Coast, Wrong Range
for Coast Data
Pegged During Coast
Signal Invalid During Coast and
Second Burn
Pegged From 6380 Seconds on
Recording Lost Throughout Flight
Pegged Throughout First Burn
Recording Lost at Restart
Signal Lost at 686 Seconds from
Liftoff '
Signal Lost at Engine Restart
R-7_50-2
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PRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS
OXIDIZER PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
Description
A study was made of the S-IVB oxidizer tank pressurization system opera-
tion to determine if the system performed satisfactorily and to determine
if the system may have contributed to the engine failure. A leak in the
stage cold helium system resulted in a loss of between 130 and 200 pounds
of helium during the 180-minute orbital coast period. Part of this study
was %o determine if that leak was associated with the engine failure.
System Operation
A schematic of the oxidizer tank pressurization system is shown in Fig. 60.
For S-1VB use, the J-2 heat exchanger operates with two open coils. Cold
helium is supplied from a stage regulator at 385 ±25 psia. Downstream of
the heat exchanger, the vehicle pressurization module contains two parallel
flow paths. One path contains a fixed orifice and is always open. The
other contains an open-closed overpressurization valve controlled from
a pressure switch sensing tank ullage pressure, The switch opens the
valve at 38 psia and closes it at _0-psia tank pressure. Downstream of
the pressurization module, the hot gas from the heat exchanger mixes with
n.5-1b/sec cold bypass helium prior to injection into the tank. The tem-
perature of the pressurant varies between 300 and 500 R.
Plots of heat exchanger weight flow, outlet pressure, outlet temperature,
and oxidizer tank pressure for first burn on AS-502 flight, AS-502 stage
acceptance, AS-501 flight, and AS-501 stage acceptance are presented in
Fig. 61 through (_,,respectively. The step changes to helium flow and
heat exchanger outlet pressure occur with opening and closing the over-
pressurization valve.
136
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Conclusions
It was concluded that:
i. The heat exchanger and oxidizer tank pressurization system
operated within model specification limits of flow, pressure,
and temperature throughout the first burn.
2. Heat exchanger flow and discharge pressure were approximately
10 percent lower on AS-502 flight than on stage acceptance or
on AS-501 flight.
3. Some of the flight data suggest a leak in the tank pressurization
system throughout first burn, but this evidence is inconclusive.
If a helium leak was present, the leak rate was between 0.02 and
0.06 lb/sec.
4. No connection has been established between the oxidizer tank
pressurization system and the engine failure.
5. No direct connection has been established between the helium
leak during orbital coast and the engine failure.
Analysis
Operation of the tank pressurization system for AS-501 and AS-502 first-
burn stage acceptance and flight are presented in Fig. 61 through 6_.
Included in the figures are plots versus time of heat exchanger outlet
pressure, outlet temperature, weight flowrate, and oxidizer tank ullage
pressure.
On AS-502 flight, the heat exchanger operated within model specification
limits of flow, discharge pressure, and discharge temperature throughout
first burn. The heat exchanger operating envelopes are shown in Fig. 65
and 66 with the flight operating points marked. As shown, the outlet
pressure was on the low side of the envelope.
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Flow and pressure were lower by approximately 10 percent than on stage
acceptance or on AS-501 flight or stage acceptance. In the three l_t_er
cases, system operation was quite consistent. On flight AS-502, the two
pressure measurements (DO 161 and DO 225) in the discharge line confirmed
the lower level. Heat exchanger inlet pressure (DO 105) malfunctioned on
the flight, so this pressure was unknown.
The lower pressure and flow could be explained by a lower regulator dis-
charge pressure or by a leak in the engine or stage helium line downstream
of the regulator. Following the stage acceptauce firing, the regulator was
replaced, so no data are available on operatiJEL of that specific regulator
in the stage. The specification limits on re_ulator discharge pressure
are 385 ±25 psia. If regulator pressure was lower on the flight, it still
operated within specification limits. If no leak occurred on AS-502, the
estimated regulator discharge pressure was 380 psia. 0nAS-501, the esti-
mated regulator discharge pressure was _1_ psia. If the lower pressure
resulted from helium leakage, the leak occurred between the regulator and
the pressurization module downstream of the heat exchanger. Assuming
regulator discharge pressure was the same as on stage acceptance firing,
the calculated leakage was between 0.02 and 0.06 lb/sec, depending on the
leak location. The lower flow assumes a leak at the pressurization module
downstream of the heat exchanger. The higher flow assumes a le_c in the
heat exchanger inlet line at the engine interface. The available leakage
evidence is inconclusive and no positive statement can be made without
regulator discharge pressure data.
Sta_eHelium Leak
There was a leak in the stage helium system durin_ orbital coast. Between
130 and 200 pounds of helium were lost during the 180-minute coast, for an
average leakage between 0.012 and 0.018 Ib/sec. One of the objects of this
study was to determine if the helium leak was associated with the engine
problems or if it could have caused chilling of any engine components.
R_,7450-2
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The stage helium system contains shutoff valves that close at engine
cutoff. Because it occurred with those valves closed, the leak had %0
be in the stage sys÷,em either through or upstream of the valves. The
valves and other components of the pressurization system __'e mounted to
the thrust cone several feet from _he engine. The leakage rate was so
low, 0.012 to 0.018 lb/sec, that it is doubtful if this could have caused
significant chilling of any component away from the immediate vicinity of
the leak. In venting to a vacuum, the gas diffuses so rapidly that a com-
ponent several feet away would not see significant mass flux from a leak
of this magnitude.
The fire or propellant leaks from the engine may have been the cause of
the helium leak, but it is doubtful if the leak had any adverse effect
upon the engine.
FLr_L PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
The S-IVB fuel mainstage pressurization system consists of the line from
the thrust chamber fuel injection manifold to the engine inter'face, a
stage line from the interface to the pressurization module, the module,
and the ducting from the module to the tank. A study was made of the
system to determine if its operation _as satisfactory, if the system was
associated with the engine failure, and if system leakage occurred.
System Operation
A schematic of the S-IVB fuel pressurization system is shown in Fig. 67.
Gaseous fuel from the thrust chamber injection manifold is used for pres-
surization during engine firing. The flowrate is controlled by the stage
pressurization modulp. The module contains three parallel flow paths.
The primary flow path contains a fixed orifice and is always open. The
two secondary paths contain fixed orifices and an on-off valve in each
leg. No. 1 secondary is active during first burn. The valve is controlled
Jl I I I IIII I I • ,
LI)IZ TANK
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Figure 67. LH2 Tank Pressurization System
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by a pressure switch sensing tank ullage pressure, is opened when the
pressure drops to 28 psia, and closed when the pressure increases to 31
psia. No. 2 secondary is active during second burn. Its actuation pres-
sures are 31 psia pickup and 3_ psia dropout. Both secondary flow paths
are open at engine start and signalled closed at engine start command
plus 5 seconds. The pressure switch then takes over operation of the
secondary system.
Conclusions
It is concluded that:
1. Fuel pressurization system operation was satisfactory throughout
the flight.
2. No leakage was found in the fuel pressurization system.
Analysis
On AS-502 flight, the fuel tank pressure was 36 psia at first-burn engine
start and steadily decayed to 32.6 psia by engine cutoff. The secondary
valves were closed at 5 seconds and tank pressure never dropped low enough
to signal reopen. The same events occurred on AS-501 flight first burn,
on AS-501 stage acceptance, and on AS-502 stage acceptance firing. Plots
of fuel tank pressure for AS-501 and AS-502 flight first burn are given
in Fig. 68 and 69.
Plots of pressurization system operation are presented in Fig. 68 through
71. If leakage occurred in the system down to the fuel pressurization
module, this would appear as an increase in the pressure drop between engine
fuel injection manifold (DO00_) and pressurization module inlet pressure
(D010h). No such pressure drop increase occurred. Comparing those pres-
sure differences on AS-502 (Fig. 70) with AS-501 (Fig. 71), the pressure
drops are essentially the same on both. 0hAS-502, the pressurization flow-
rate decreased beginning at 680 seconds (Fig. 69), coinci_nt with the engine
performance decay and the increased fuel injection temperaMare, but the line
_essure d_op remained essentially the same.
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Pz'essul'iza_ioal flow on stage acceptance and flight for AS-502 and AS-501
are presented in Fig. 68 and 69. Prior to the engine perl'ormauce decay
at b8'3 seconds, the flow during flight was the same as during sLa_e accel_t-
ante. The l'low decrease correlated with the thrust decay and fuel in.iec-
tion temp_'ratul"e increase, and the shil'ts are explained by the entwine
|#el'|'ot'|llance ( hlIIlgel_.
®
On both vehicles, the pressure drop from fuel injection manifold to module
inlet was steady at approximately 35 psi throughout first burn. Based oa
instz'umt.ntati,m accuracy, etc., it is believed that a detectable increase
in that pressure drol_ would be 15 psi. It" a leak occurred in the first
flex hose in the line, the 15-psi additional pressure drop would occur
with a leakage flowrate of approximately 0.2 lb/sec. Further downstream,
the corr,.sponding leak flow would be less. Because no increased pressure
eh'op was detected, it is concluded that no leakage occurred i,l the fuel
pressurization system.
As shown is_ Fig. 68 and 69, fuel pressurization module inlet temperature
was higher than fuel injection temperature by about 10 degrees. The same
phenomenon occurred on stage static firing. This indicates a temperature
increase in the fuel pressurization line and, if true, comes as a result
of a heat flux of 20 Btu/sec into the line. Analysis has proved that no
such heat source is available, even with the fire in the engine area.
Because this temperature increase occurred on AS-501 also, it is not
believed associated with the failure.
Fuel injection temperature is not uniform around the periphery of the
injection manifold. Temperature differences as great as 30 degrees have
been measured on RSd) thrust chambers. It is believed that these normal
variations explain the differences between measurements on the flight.
Pressurization flm¢ ie calculated using compressible flow equations through
the fixed orifices in the pressurization module. The module effective
areas have been determined by McDonnell Douglas. The flov equation uses
tllat effective area, the module inlet pressure_ inlet temperature, and
the gas properties of the fluid.
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ENGINE START CONDITIONS
EVETr DESCRIPTION
The engine test conditions at liftoff, engine start command signal (ESC)
for the first burn (T+577.2 seconds), and ESC for the restart (T+II,61_
seconds) were within specified limits.
Table 14 summarizes the stage and engine propellant system parameters in-
cluding helium tank conditions at liftoff, first burn, and restart. No
anomalies were noted except for several minor discrepancies associated
with instrumentation. Crossplots of oxidizer pump inlet pressure versus
oxidizer pump inlet temperature, engine fuel inlet pressure versus engine
fuel inlet temperature, and oxidizer pump discharge pressure versus dis-
charge temperature are presented in Fig. 72 through 74. The data zhow
that pump NPSH at start as well as the oxidizer propellant quality for
both first burn and restart were adequate and well within the engine
model specification limits.
Figure 7_ presents the engine start bottle conditions at liftoff, first
burn, and restart. All values were within the prescribed envelopes.
Table 15 presents the pertinent engine sequence data for both first burn
and restart. All engine mechanical and electrical sequencing appeared
normal.
Conclusions
It is concluded that:
le All conditions at engine start signal (both first burn and
restart) were proper.
2. All engine sequence functions were properly accomplished.
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TABLE 15
AS-502-S-IVB FIRST-BURN AND RESTART ENGINE SEQUENCE DATA
Measure No.
First Burn
K21
K7
KI0
KII
K6
K126
KII9
KII8
K20
K127
K96
K125
K122
K96
K5
K121
Kl16
K122
Ell7
K12_
K125
K157
K159
KI_
K158
KI20
Range Time,
seconds
577.270
577.270
577.281
577.281
577.290
577.338
577.5_2
577.365
577.382
577._21
580.289
58o._32
58o.515
580.739
580.750
58o.8_o
580.8_i
580,882
380.968
580.990
581.21_
582.o31
582.031
582.930
Event State
Engine Start - On Yes
Helium Control Solenoid Energize Ye3
Thrust Chamber Spark System - On Yes
Gas Generator Spark System- 0n Yes
Ign._ion Phase Control Solenoid Yes
Energize _
Oxidizer Bleed Valve - Close_ Yes
HFV- Closed _ No
MFV- Open i_ Yes
ASI Oxidizer Valve - Open Yes
Fuel Bleed Valve - Closed Yes
Start Tank Discharge Control Energize Yes
Start Tank Discharge Valve - Closed No
Start Tank Discharge Valve - Open Yes
Start Tank Discharge Control Energize No
Mainstage Control Solenoid Energize Yes
M0V- Closed No
Gas Generator Valve - Closed No
STDV- Open No
Gas Generator Valve - Open Yes
0TBV- Open No
OTBV- Close Yes
Hainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 2 Yes
Rainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 2 - No
Depress
Mainstage OK Pressure Switch No. I Yes
Hainstage OK Pressure Switch No. I - No
Depress
MOV- Open Yes
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TAB_ 15
(Continued)
Measure No.
First Burn
KI3
El2
K5
K6
KI40
K20
KI20
KII7
KII8
KII6
K157
K15S
K159
KI21
KII9
KI2_
K7
K127
K126
Restart
K1/,0
K21
K7
K121
K6
Range Time,
seconds
7_7.036
7_7.o57
7_7.038
7_7.05h
7_7.0o4
7_7.123
7_7. I_5
7_7.195
7_7.203
7_7.253
7_7.269
7_7.269
7_7.269
7_7.269
747.271
747.455
747.919
748.035
750.662
750.745
11,613.308
11,614.617
11,614.671
11,614.671
iI,61_.681
Event
Engine Cutoff Signal
Engine Ready Signal
Hainstage Control Solenoid - Energize
Ignition Phase Control Solenoid -
Energize
Engine Cutoff Command - On Yes
ASI Oxidizer Valve - Open No
MOV- Open No
Gas Generator Valve - Open No
HFV- Open No
Gas Generator Valve - Close Yes
Hainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 1 No
Hainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 2 No
Rainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 1 - Yes
Depress
Hainstage OK Pressure Switch No. 2 - Yes
Depress
HOV- Close Yes
HFV- Close Yes
OTBV - Open Yes
Helium Control Solenoid - Energize No
Fuel Bleed Valve - Close No
Oxidizer Bleed Valve - Close No
State
Yes
No
No
No
Engine Cutoff Command - On No
Engine Start - On Yes
Helium Control Solenoid - Energize Yes
M0V - Close Yes
Ignition Phase Control Solenoid - Yes
Energize
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TABLE 15
(Concluded)
1
Measure No. I
Restart
KI0
KII
KII9
KII8
K20
K127
K126
K96
K123
K122
K5
K96
I{116
K122
KI21
KI2_
K123
K125
KII7
KI20
KI3
K5
KI2
KI20
KI_0
KIlT
KII8
K125
zn9
K127
K126
Range Time,
seconds
iI,61_.681
11,614.681
11,614.755
iI,61_.756
iI,61_.783
11,614.823
iI,61_.823
11,622.678
11,622.825
11,622.916
11,625.128
11,623.128
11,625.255
11,625.266
11,623.280
II,623.3_6
11,623.466
11,623.571
11,623.671
11,625.196
11,650.397
11,630.403
Ii,630._7
II,630._71
II,630._75
11,630.521
11,630.530
II,630.6_I
11,630.757
11,633.989
11,633.989
Event State
Thrust Chamber Spark System - On Yes
Gas Genera%or Spark System - On Yes
MFV- Close No
MFV- Open Yes
ASI Oxidizer Valve - Open Yes
Fuel Bleed Valve - Close Yes
Oxidizer Bleed Valve - Close Yes
STDV Control Solenoid - Energize Yes
STDV- Close No
STDV- Open" Yes
Mainstage Control Solenoid - Energize Yes
STDV Control Solenoid - Energize No
Gas Generator Valve - Close No
STDV- Open No
M_ - Close No
0_BV - Open No
STIR - Close Yes
0TBV- Close Yes
Gas Generator Valve - Open Yes
MOV - Open Yes
Engine Cutoff Signal Yes
Mains%age Control Solenoid - Energize No
Engine Ready Signal No
MOV- Open No
Engine Cutoff Command - On Yes
Gas Genera%or Valve - Open No
MFV- Open No
0TBV- Close No
MFV - Close Yes
Fuel Bleed Valve - Close No
Oxidizer Bleed Valve - Close No
of no
163/16_
_TE: Mainstage OK pressure switches did not pick up as a result
thrus_ chamber pressure buildup.
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VERIFICATION TESTING AT SSFL
Two J-2 I_D engines, J00_-5 and J016-J_, were tested at VT5-2 to investi-
gate the hypothesized failure modes occurring on the S-II and S-IVB stages
of AS-502. Engine J00_-5 was tested to obtain engine performance gain
factors with known quantities of propellant leakage. Gains from the sim-
ulated ASI fuel leak test (313-035) were used in the performance shift
analysis (Engine Performance section). No gains were obtained from the
oxidizer leak test because of a ._echanical failure in the oxidizer system.
One test was conducted on engine JO05-_ in an attempt to simulate portions
of the suspected S-II failure mode. This test (313-036) was not completely
successful because the leak system was not sized properly. Engine JO16-_
was set up specific_.lly to simulate portions of the suspected S-IVB failure
mode. It is this test (313-0_1) that is discussed in this section.
ENGI_ JO16-.-g CONFIGURATION
J-21_Dengine d016-g was built up to a configaration similar to engine
J20h2, the S-IVB engine on AS-502. An ASI injector was installed that
had a hitch oxidizer-side resistance and an average fuel-side resistance,
and the ASI oxidizer orifice diameter was 0.125 inch.
The engine was calibrated to a thrust level of approximately 229K at an
overall mixture ratio of 5.5 and a fuel turbine inlet temperature of
1250 F. These were the levels experienced during flight on engine J20_2.
A servocontrolled throttle valve was installed in the ASI fuel line so
that the ASI fuel flow could be regulated to the desired flowrate as _1
function of time. The system, including the servovalve, was flow cali-
brated in liquid hydrogen prior to installation on the engine. A tee
was installed in the ASI fuel line immediately upstream of the _SI. The
tee led to a low-resistance dump system which could essentially open the
ASI fuel system to atmosphere, thus simulating an ASI line failure.
These systems are depicted schematically in Fig. 76.
165
PI
TP p
PB
_I FUEL LI/_
DO_EAM
FUEL INLET
DUCT SHIELD
T6
I
T7
Figure 76. AS-502 S-IVB Failure Simulation Test, Engine JO16-_, Test 313-0hl
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Special instrumentation was installed so that the ASI fuel flow could be
measured during the gradual flo_ decrease, and the temperature of the gas
backflowing across the ASI fuel injector could be measured after the hot-
gas dump valve was opened. Table 16 lists the special parameters meas-
ured, and Fig. 76 shows their locations. ASI fuel flow was measured using
the pressure drop from P_ to P3, the density at TT, and the resistance
versu_ valve position curve which had been generated during the ASI fuel
system calibration. It was anticipated that the hot-gas temperature could
be measured with the hot-gas dump fluid temperature (T2) and the skin
temperatures T1, T3, T_, and TS. The ASI ignition detector probe was
able to measure a temperature within the ASI chamber. A pressure measure-
ment was installed in the ASI-to-injector seal bleed port to indicate when
and if the primary seal burned through.
TEST OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this test was to verify, if possible, the validity
of the theory set forth on the cause of the chain of failure events occur-
ring during AS-502 S-IVB first burn. These events have been discussed
in detail in earlier sections of this report, and the proposed theory is
summarized in Table 17 for the purpose of comparison with the failure
simulation test on engine JO16-_. The test was expected to determine
whether significant ASI damage could occur when the ASI is forced to
operate under the mixture ratio and baekflow transients hypothesized
during AS-502.
PROCEDURE
Test 0_1 events are shown in Fig. 77. After 20 seconds of mainstage,
the PUvalve was closed to bring engine performance to the level of engine
J20_2 on AS-502. At 65 seconds, the ASI fuel servovalve was closed to
_2 percent, reducing ASI fuel from a nominal 0.9 lb/sec flowrate to 0.6
lb/sec. This results in ASI operation anticipated with an overboard leak
of approximately 0.5 lb/sec from the downstream l/2-inch flex hose in the
ASI fuel line. The engine ran for 35 secoJlds in this situation, simulating
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TABLE 16
SPECIAL INSTRIIMENTATION FOR S-IVB FAILURE SIMULATION TEST
(Engine JOI6-_, Te,t 313--0_I)
Designation
In Fig. 76 Parameter Name Type of Measurement
P_
T7
T8
P5
P6
P7
P)
P2
T6
T5
T1
T2
P1
T4
T5
P ASl
PB
Tp
ASI Fuel Line Inlet Pressure
ASI Fuel Line Temperature
ASI Fuel Bypass Orifice Temperature
ASI Fuel Bypass Orifice
Upstream Pressure
ASI Fuel Bypass Orifice
Downstream Pressure
ASI Fuel Servovalve Outlet Pressure
Fluid Static Pressure
Fluid Temperature
Fluid Temperature
Fluid Static Pressure
Fluid Static Pressure
Fluid Static Pressure
ASI Fuel Line Pressure
Gas Generator Fuel Injection
Pressure
ASI Fuel Injection Temperature
Fuel Duct Environment Temperature
ASI Fuel Line Skin Temperature
ASI Hot-Gas D_mp Temperature
ASI Hot-Gas Dunp Pressure
ASI Fuel Line Skin Temperature
ASI Fuel Line Skin Temperature
ASI Chamber Pressure
ASI Seal Bleed Pressure
Restart Probe Temperature
Fluid Static Pressure
Fluid Static Pressure
!Fluid Temperature
Skin Temperature
Skin Temperature
Fluid Temperature
Fluid Static Pressure
Skin Temperature
Skin Temperature
Fluid Pressure
Fluid Pressure
Fluid Temperature
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the period between range time 6_5 and 680 seconds on AS-502 (where ex-
ternal chilling xms noted but no performance change occurred).
Beginning at I00 seconds, the ASI fuel servovalve was ramped from _2-
percent open to full-closed in 27 seconds. The servo bypass system was
sized so that ASI fuel flow would be approximately 0.03 ib/sec when the
servovalve was full closed. Gradually decreasing the ASI fuel flow simu-
lated a gradually increasing leak in the ASI fuel line. _lis caused the
ASI mixture ratio to increase from 0.9 to 20 over a period of 27 secohds.
The ASI operated in an eroding region (above 2.5 mixture ratio) for i0 _
secouds, including 3 seconds at a mixture ratio of 20.
At this time, the hot-gas dump valve was opened, allowing the ASI fuel
line to atmosphere, At the same time, the AS1 fuel flow was completely
shut off by closing the servovalve bypass. This allowed backflow through
the ASI fuel injector and simulated a completely separated ASI fuel line.
The engine was allowed to operate in this condition for 28 seconds, when
an observer terminated the test because of excessive external fire.
TEST RF.SULTS
Test 313-0_i proceeded as planned, wi_h the exception of the premature
shutdown because of excessive fire. The only abnormality noted when the
ASI fuel servovalve was stepped to _2-percent open was that the restart
probe temperature failed, possibly indicating a change in flame front
location in the ASI at this time. As the servovalve was ramped from 42
percent to full closed, the ASI nozzle (main injector) eroded for approi-
imately the last I0 seconds of the ramp. This was clearly seen in the
films of the test.
Figure 77 illustrates the servovalve position and the resultant ASI
mixture ratio during the entire test. The point of first ASI erosion,
as determined from the films, was at an ASI mixture ratio of 2.5.
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In Fig. 78 , the estimated ASI mixture ratio transient on AS-502, which
was reconstructed based on the suspected location and magnitude of the
ASI fuel system leak, is shown and compared with the results of the
failure simulation test.
The resulting hardware damage clearly indicated that the S-IVB failure
mode hypothesized is feasible. The ASI nozzle (main injector) was severely
eroded, increasing the throat diameter from 0.7 to 0.9 inch (see Fig. 79).
Erosion had progressed through the ASI nozzle wall into the main fuel
injector for 360 degrees, and had invaded oxidizer elements 1 and 2.
This damage is shown in Fig. 80 through 82. At 128 seconds after STDV
(1.2 seconds prior to hot-gas dump valve open), the ASI-to-injector-to-
primary seal failed. This was indicated by a sudden rise in the seal
bleed port pressure at this time. All this damage occurred between I19.6
and 129.2 seconds after STI)Vwhile the ASI mixture ratio was increasing
from 2.5 to 20.
After the hot-gas dump valve was opened, 129.2 seconds after STDV, damage
occurred to the ASI itself and adjacent external engine components. The
damage was a result of hot combustion products mixing with ASI oxidizer
and flowing backward through the ASI flel injector and out the _I fuel
inlet to atmosphere. Unfortunately, the skin temperature measurements,
Tl, T3, T_, and TS, and the hot-gas dump temperature, T2j all failed within
seconds after the hot-gas dump valve was opened. T_ lasted about 2 seconds
and indicated 1900 F when it failed. T5 lasted about 5 seconds, and was
at 1500 F and risingwhen it failed.
Approximately 1/2 second after the hot-gas dump valve was opened, the ASI
fuel line burned through, opening the ASI fuel injector manifold directly
to atmosphere. From the films it appeared that the ASI fuel line burned
through under the gimbal bearing and very close to the ASI body. Within
seconds, the ASI fuel line had been burned back to the center of the down-
stream flex hose, and the hot-gas dump system had been burned back 1 foot
from where it teed into the ASI fuel line. The first sign of green flame,
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indicating burning copper, was noted (from the films) to occur 8 seconds
after the external fire started, or about 8-1/2 seconds after injector
backflow started.
Hot combustion products continued to spew from the ASI for the duration
of the test, 28 seconds after the hot-gas dump valve opened. The ASI
fuel injector was eroded so that over 180 degrees of the fuel injector
manifold was exposed on the inside (only three of the eight luel orifices
were intact). Both spark plug tips, which are in the plane of the oxidizer
fan, were severely eroded. A large hole (approximately 1/2 by 1 inch)
was burned radially outward through the ASI body in the plane of the fuel
inlet line. The spark plug cable on the fuel inlet side was burned off.
Most of this damage is shoxm iu Fig. 83. A portion of the hot gas and
molten slag passed between the ASI body _nd the gimbal bearing and exited
on the oxidizer side of the engine. Slag was deposited on the ASI oxidizer
inlet line, the oxidizer-side spark plug, and the ASI ignition-detector
probe housing, overheating these elements to some extent. This damage is
illustrated in Fig. 8_. The external surface of the main oxidizer dome
and the gimbal Leafing were erod,_d in the plane of the fuel inlet line.
Figures 82 and85 illustrate the damage to the oxidizer dome. The dom_
thiclmess had been reduced to 0.15 inch in this region, which is one-third
its normal thickness.
A significant, but gradual, performance decay was noted during the first
12 seconds of hot-gas flow overboar_ through the ASI fuel injector.' This
performance decay is attributed to increasing overboard propellant flow
as the opening through the ASI was aggravated by erosion. The performance
decay is tabulated in the Engine Performance section and compared to the
performance decay noted during S-IVB first burn of AS-502. Much of the
instrumentation was erroneous after the hot gas began flowing overboard
because of the external fire, but it does appear that the performance
decay subsided after 12 seconds and that performance was stabAe for the
remaining 16 seconds of the test. It is conjectured that the performance
decay subsides when sufficient fuel is flowing from the mal_ injector
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